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Preface
This text is an outline for the opening chapters of an upcoming
book  on  explanatory,  interpretative  and  understanding
approaches  to  social  studies  in  general  and  case  studies  in
particular.
Both chapters, ”Coming to Terms - on language, induction, deduction
and our uncertain grasp of realities,”  and  “Truth  –  a  concept  of
imagination with many faces,” are revised versions of two previous
working papers, now combined into one.
The  third  chapter,  “In case of case research – different approaches
within social research, generalization, self-awareness and nearness to
field of study”, is also available in a revised version as Working
Paper 2004-9/rev.ed. and will be forwarded by request (contact
the author).
The remaining chapters will deal with the practical challenges of
empirically-based social research in general and of case studies in
particular,  whether  they  be  conducted  in  an  explanatory,
interpretative or understanding mode!
Please  excuse  the  empty  footnotes:  they  are  part  of  my  own
account for internal references for the project as a whole.
Comments and observations regarding the present text are most
welcome.  They  will  be  appreciated  –  be  they  nasty  and/or
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grasp of realities
Talking is one issue, knowing another
I grew up at the Sugar Mill in the outskirts of a provincial town in
Demark. Since everybody knew and kept an eye on ’the engineer’s
son’,  “Little  Erik”  was  allowed  to  go  wherever  he  pleased.  I
explored everything: the stables, the flumes, the scrap yard as well
as strolled along the ’sugar beet tracks’, which stretched for miles
into the surrounding landscape.
At six I had to leave the paradise of my early years. My father
had been promoted to a position as purchasing manager at the
Sugar Mill’s head office in Copenhagen. We had to move to the
city and I got a shock when I saw my new school. It was so
immensely big compared to the village school from back home.
But I settled down, thanks to our wonderful teacher, Miss Ras-
mussen.
In the third year at school, “Erik” learned a lesson for life. We
had a course on a subject I was very fond of: Guided by a textbook
we  were  to  make  drawings  of  how  things  are  made!  For
pedagogical reasons, presumably, the production of e.g. flour,
butter, beer, forks, etc, was illustrated as if it took place in a big
country kitchen. I was ready to accept the fact that berries were
picked, rinsed and cooked with sugar on the stove, or that soap
was made by boiling the fat of a dead sow blended with ashes
from the stove. But when the teacher told us that sugar was made
by wheeling beets in a barrow into the scullery, chopping them up
with a knife and throwing them into a pot, I raised my hand and
protested: “Sugar is made in a factory.”
The teacher would not give me room to speak. I was aghast. The
class had been told something which was not true. I asked my
father for help. In the late 1940s there were not many brochures,
but he gave me a small leaflet on the Danish Sugar Mills with a
picture of the most beautiful of them all, Saxkjøbing Sugar Mill, on
the front.
A week later I went to the teacher’s desk and handed him the
leaflet. I was sure that now he would ask me to explain to the class
how sugar was really made. But he sculled me furiously: “Return
to your seat”.2
Back at my desk, I peeked at him, not so much shaken as full of
wonder. Then little by little it dawned to me what I had learned:
“You  cannot  be  sure  that  adults  know  what  they  are  talking
about”. And worse “you cannot even expect them to want to
know.”
The incident might have, but did not, turn me into a rebel. In a
way, I still trusted my father, my grandmother and, of course, my
closest schoolmates. I already had reservations about my mother,
but that is another story. – But strangers! I listened and repeated
the lessons taught. Amongst the top of my class, certainly! But well
aware of being like a parrot! I did not believe one iota of what I
was told about geography, history and religion. I enjoyed being
told how Charlemagne had arranged his own funeral two years
before he died so that he could enjoy the procession sitting on top
of it all in his coffin. But how was I to know whether this had
actually happened? Who could?
However, I clearly sensed that I should avoid discussing this
with adults. The teachers themselves could not know whether
what they told us was in fact true. They just repeated what they
had read in books. So exam after exam, I repeated without passion
what I knew was expected of me.
Furthermore,  some  of  the  things  we  were  taught  were
unmistakably absurd. For some reason I had no doubts that Jesus
had actually lived. But he could hardly have been able to gain
recognition among his fellow countrymen, if at the same time he
really  had  befriended  tax  collectors  of  the  Roman  occupying
power! It would be much the same thing if Jesus had been on good
terms with the Gestapo and the members of the German auxiliary
police  recruited  among  Danish  collaborators  during  the  then
recent German Occupation of Denmark. I did not believe it then
and I still do not believe it!
I also failed to comprehend what the Old Testament had to do
with Jesus. Jehovah stated a lot of rules, e.g. you shall not make
images of God, lie and steal. But if Jesus was hungry, he and his
entourage just – as if they were birds – picked the grain they
needed  from  any  field  they  passed.  I  was  fascinated.  Jesus
apparently  acted  as  if  rules  are  only  rules1.  And  it  was  also
                                                   
1 He did not preach stealing though, see Mark 10:18-20. I just then thought it
more advisable to notice how he acted. Deeds count.3
obvious that he did not care much for scribes, priests and others
who based their claims to wisdom on something read in books.
But, as mentioned earlier, I remained well behaved. I had a gut
feeling it would not help me to follow the example of Jesus and
just nick apples whenever I pleased. Nor would it help either of us
if I bothered our various religious educators with my conversion
of the old texts into the frame of present everyday life. I just
watched them in wonder, when they cheerfully talked about the
child Moses and the ”sweet Jesus”, as if they could not tell them
apart. It was not until later, in secondary school, that I began to see
the light. Geometry was a revelation. Now I could prove that a
statement was true, just as the exercises in physics allowed me to
check on the spot whether what the books said could be true.
The feeling of unease at just being told to believe has never left
me. As an eighteen-year-old engineer student, I was standing at
the  rail  on  board  a  steamship  heading  for  Ceuta  in  Spanish
Morocco wondering whether the ”Africa” I had learned about in
school did in fact exist. It did not! Today, I might readily talk about
the latest unemployment figures or discuss the situation in Russia.
Yet I am very well aware that I have no idea whether what we are
led to believe is true or just what some people want us to believe.
Play-acting
Of course, I learned more than that. Being on the lookout I realized
that adults – whatever their shortcomings – did not deliberately
lie. They were just victims of an inner desire to appear informed.
The sheer ability to show them selves able to explain other people
what was going on was merely stronger than any drive they might
have had towards exploring the depth of whatever they were
talking about.
Nor did it occur to me that adults could be covering up and,
according to the audience, play the role that suited the occasion
best, as if distinguishing between ”backstage” and ”on stage”.2
No, they appeared to be sincere. They just tended to use their
ability to convince others to prove to themselves that they knew
what they were talking about. Simply a matter of, “if what I say is
convincing to you, I myself might as well believe it too!”
                                                   
2 E Goffman: The presentation of the Self in Everyday Life, (1959), Doubleday,
New York, 1959.4
Apparently the ability to deceive others is too tempting not to
exploit even when one deceives oneself in turn. We hear. We
speak. We enjoy believing what we say. Generally we have no idea
of “who” or perhaps “what” is speaking through our mouths. It is
as if we surrender our voices to a prompter – whose existence we
do not recognize or even less want to acknowledge.
All this was brought back to me later as a fieldworker. As an
experienced interviewer, I believe myself to be sensitive to the
choice of words, images and metaphors used by the other, as well
as what “the Other” may express by the tone of voice, rapidity of
speech, posture, etc… Thus I believe I am able to distinguish
between insincere professional make-believe, flashy self- promo-
tion and authentic search for expression. However, it is a mission
full of traps, including those we lay for ourselves. Academia serves
us all too well to theorize and thus interpret instead of trying to
familiarize ourselves with what may be going on inside, among
and around other people as well as ourselves, here and now. Thus
we cart along in-numerous tricks to deceive ourselves:
The trivia of everyday scientific debate: Looking around for
arguments to fit “your” case – an example
“The way employee ownership was set up in the US is a ‘rip-off’,”
Joseph  R.  Blasi  states  again  and  again  in  his  book  Employee
Ownership.3  He  enthusiastically supports the idea of employee
ownership, but not the ESOP4-laws supporting it.
"It is excellent that the government provides ownership to be
put in the hands of people who could not otherwise afford it.”5
Yet most ESOPs are constituted just to serve the interest of top
management,” Blasi states. The base of his argument is the rather
                                                   
3  Joseph Blasi: Employee Ownership – Revolution or Ripoff, Ballinger 1988,
quote page 117.
4  ESOP: Employee Stock Ownership Plan. Companies where ownership is
set up according to these laws are called ESOPs in order to distinguish
them from e.g. co-ops.
5  The law makes it possible for an owner who sells his stock to all the
employees to postpone gain tax. Just as the credit institutions get some tax
advantages when they provide the new owners with capital to close the
deal. The tricky part of the law, though, is the provision that even though
an owner sells his stock to the employees, he may still maintain control of it
on their behalf until the loan has been paid back.5
unfortunate fact that employees behind a leveraged buyout can be
denied the right to vote their shares. "Nothing in the ESOP law
said that worker ownership should contain the rights and respon-
sibilities that normally accompany ownership."6 Instead, top man-
agement being trustees of the ESOP Fund vote and thus decide on
the employees' behalf, as managers have always seen themselves
entitled to. Thus the Blasi thesis: "EMPLOYEE-OWNERSHIP AS IT
IS SET UP IN THE US IS A RIP-OFF."
Are we able to confirm his thesis? Yes, we are! Can I disprove it?
Yes, I can! What then? Well, let us look at the arguments using my
own research7 as support.
Thesis confirmed
Having followed a number of employee-owned companies over a
four-year period, a first question could be whether I have facts8 to
document that management has used the creation of an ESOP to
further its own interests? Yes I have!
A number of top managers told me that one of their motives for
letting the employees buy the company was to fend off outside
buyers who might had wanted to replace them with their own
management  team.  Furthermore  some  managers,  during  the
transition into an ESOP, even succeeded in acquiring additional
benefits on behalf of the other owners to be.
.. whereas other facts prove the thesis to be wrong
Next, we may ask whether I have the necessary facts to document
that ESOP managers perceive employee ownership not just as a
means to enrich themselves, but as a means to reconcile the tra-
ditional conflict between the employees as hired hands and man-
agement as the sole decision makers? Yes, I am able to document
how some top managers did their utmost to initiate participation,
educate the employees and did in fact succeed in setting up effective
problem-solving teams.
                                                   
6  Joseph Blasi, op. cit. pages 150.
7 Erik Maaløe: The Employee Owner, – organizational & individual change within
manufacturing companies as participation and sharing grow, Akademisk Forlag,
Copenhagen 1998.
8 The concept “fact” is here used in the general sense as a name for e.g
observations. We will later, page XX, return to a more proper distinction
between fact and data.6
In  such  companies  accounts  were  made  open.  Management
made themselves vulnerable to the scrutiny of the employees, as
they realized that the quality of their decision-making ought to be
tested as well as the decisions taken on the floor. The more people
are encouraged and trained to participate in the affairs of the com-
pany, the better "we" will become at serving the needs of the
market and ourselves as managerial employee owners. Further-
more, my investigation9 should leave no one in doubt of the pain
that such a transition inflicts on individual managers when going
from a traditional to an open social environment operated under
mutual control.
Yet reality seems even more muddled!
Thus it seems that I have facts to both confirm and reject the initial
thesis.  Some  readers  may  now  say:  "You  can  always  find  a
company that validates either alternative". That may be true, and if
taken at face value, the argument can very well tell us why some
people look at case studies with suspicion.
Fortunately, I can do more than that. I can give you examples of
companies where the best managers are driven by a desire to get
as much out of the new situation, while at the same time being
open, and challenging the employees to participate and monitor
their leadership! Just as I can give you examples of companies in
which the CEO sincerely struggled to enhance employee influence
while being undermined by middle managers. I can even name
companies where some of the stewards, at least initially, fought
participation.
So we are left with the question: Are we in a mess or is reality
just a mess?
Tricks to use in order to circumvent conflicting facts
The example above tells us that we must learn how to handle
potentially conflicting facts. Luckily there is an array of strategies
to choose from, which we will just touch upon:
Stick to your guns
Those who already know, have no choice − be it believers in the
shady nature of people in management or those who are just sure
                                                   
9 Erik Maaløe: The Employee Owner, op. cit.7
that "management ought to and does know best". Either you are
on the side of the employees, or you will – what is most likely for
an organizational theorist – be uncritically pro-management. So
data11 are exploited accordingly, just as any zealous researcher
can make pieces of data fit in order to undermine any fact on
which a colleague has based his theoretical conclusion. He – the
poor sot – is, of course, biased.
Yet there are at least three other alternatives:
1: Talk your way out of problems
Sure, facts matter, but so do the ways we present them. So let us
try to overcome the inconvenience of everyday richness of interest
and  perspectives  rhetorically:  "Top-management  in  employee-
owned companies may, as one of the means of serving their own
interest, favor participation as a means to encourage individual
prudence and greater efficiency to the benefit of themselves".
This formulation, while still carrying the flavor of the Blasi the-
sis, eloquently absorbs the otherwise outright contradiction of
facts. 2: Bolster up
Still better, you may try to guard your position against attack.
Good management will always search for and implement the right
solutions. So let us for the sake of argument side along with a
fellow researcher who assumes that managers generally know
best, because if they did not, they would not have been chosen for
the  job.  This  in  itself  explains  why  managers  are  entitled  to
benefits. And should they fail, it is “obviously” due to “employee
resistance  to  change”.  “There  are  so  many  ways  in  which
employees can make a solution not work”.12
The trick here is to avoid contact with the intricacies of reality
and stick to generalities in order to defend your position.
                                                   
11 Here data is used in the general sense of observations made and converted
to text, including figures. As mentioned above, we will later, page XX,
return to a proper distinction between fact and data.
12 Paraphrase from The Employee Owner, op cit
14 John Locke: An essay concerning Human Understanding, (1690),8
3: or embark on more intensive and explorative fieldwork!
By appearance convoluted rhetoric may serve us well as a cover
up for a muddled reality. But a poor solution for a realist! In the
long run slick words cannot dampen the pressure of a multifaceted
reality. Further in-depth studies of individual cases may be a more
sustainable solution.
In  the  present  case,  extensive  fieldwork  revealed  that  the
aforementioned tension in ESOP companies is but one phase in a
potential cultural transformation process – from a traditionally
owned company to an employee-owned. If successful this may last
up to seven years. Yes, in the beginning some top managers of
companies that have been turned into ESOPs did have an eye on
their own interest. The unimaginative self-interest of many a man-
ager does not just evaporate as shared ownership is introduced.
Yet participation, when initiated, paved the way for ultimately
making managers as well as workers responsible to each other as
owners.
Look further
Therefore the question is not whether fact A or fact B confirms or
refutes  a  thesis,  but  how  to  reconcile  what,  due  to  a  priori
theoretical thinking, appears as a paradox. In the case referred to
above we did it by introducing an additional and certainly realistic
dimension in the discussion: Time!
A confusing, muddled reality should be seen as a gift to a case
researcher. It is an invitation to challenge and extend the practical
as well as the theoretical conditionsfor the venture. Exploratory
field-based inquiry could thus guide us to become aware of issues
that  ultimately  will  lead  us  to  a  more  comprehensive
understanding. This is what we shall explore after having looked
at the role of theory.
Our awareness of the realities we are enmeshed in is indeed very
fragile
What we sense is just a minute part of what can be sensed
The ideas and conceptions we rely on are often given to us rather
than  grounded  in  our  own  first-hand  experience.  Some  even
dispute whether “first-hand experience” is possible. They claim
that we cannot make sense out of what we experience without a
language. It alone provide us with the very names for what we can
refer to or even point at and thus make a subject for mutual talk.9
This argument is, of course, only partially true, as some artists use
other media, be it music or images, to convey their, let us say,
experiences. But to us such similes are second-hand-information,
just like descriptions of places we have visited as well as of those
which might have been. If so, the “world to see” is already set for
us through linguistic pointers and second-hand reports, cf. figure 1.
Figure  1:  KNOWLEDGE  IS  –  AT  LEAST  PARTLY  –










how it is possible, created, maintained and expanded
…In the pedestrian sense, most of us assume that what we know
and accept as useful for the conduct of practical life is either
directly  or  indirectly  derived  from  what  we  see,  hear  and/or
sense. Empiricism claims, - as John Locke told us
14
, that knowledge
is and has to be founded on sense data alone and certainly not on,
say tradition, political or religious dogma, The question remains,
though, are sense data really enough?. If so, would not animals be
as wise, as well as conceited and occasionally misguided, as men?
Nevertheless, a sense of the real must be an integrated part of our
ability to form images that help us get along as does language.
    Whether  this  is  an  idea  that  just  appears  true  as  a  naïve
presentation of how we learn to master our lives – if we do – is a
drama  in  itself;  this  drama  we  hope  to  unfold  as  the  story
progresses.
Furthermore, what we actually perceive in the sense of noticing is
but a tiny part of what we could have not only observed but used
to create images of the real, as depicted in Figure 1 – 1.1. It is as if10
there is a sieve between us and the “Domain of the Manifest
Observable”. Far the greatest part is retained
Figure  1.1:  WHAT  WE  SEE  IS  BUT  A  FRACTION  OF  THE
OBSERVABLE





will  ever  be
able  to  just
get  a  notion
of  how  it  is
possible, cre-
ated,
maintained and expanded, - how it is possible, created, maintained
and expanded grasp here and now before overloading our infor-
mation capacities
     Secondly, our joy in pleasures, our interest and even sheer need
for survival play a role as regards what we are on the lookout for.
Thus we do not use our total capacity to create images of our
world.
     Thirdly, there is a problem we may not even recognize: Not
every  word  or  concept  may  be  grounded  directly  in  the
observable, although some may have been so originally in a past
we hardly have any concrete notions of.
Sensationalism: Just stick to making sense of what we see
Sensationalism is the outlandish notion of the concept that all
knowledge derives from sensation. Most eloquently expressed by
Locke, who compares the mind with a white piece of paper on
which experience paints its information about external objects.15
Thus, the mind is seen as a passive registrant of facts. We have no
ideas about anything before we begin to perceive. We only ob-
serve. And here it stops, we are not able to transcend to the thing
itself, Locke says.
                                                   
15 John Locke up cit, Book two, chapter i, #2, Fontana, 1964.11
Before touching on “the practice of noticing”, I want to put
forward a warning: The very fact that most philosophers of science
such  as  Locke  primarily  refer  to  sight  –  when  talking  about
observing – has led to a lot of confusion. Spokespersons within
empiricist  tradition  give  priority  to  vision  as  a  channel  of
information and discard touch, smell, taste and listening. Nor do
they generally pay much heed to the plurality of motions within
our bodies called emotions. Or, even worse, emotions are thrown
aside and treated as bias – as if they are without any informational
value. This has had dire consequences. Seeing involves more than
just observing, it implies distance, not the direct felt involvement
in  the  world  of  the  Other,  nor  our  own  bodies.  This  has  led
philosophers of science to formulate observations from afar as an
ideal, for which they have reserved their version of the word
“objective”.  This  is  reflected  in  the  multitude  of  meanings  of
“seeing”, cf. figure 2.
Figure 2: DIFFERENT MEANINGS
OF SEEING, SOME LITERAL, OTHERS METAPHORICAL
•  To “see” may mean
o  to perceive with the eye: Yes, I see the worm too
o  to meet someone: I saw one of my old school pals the other
day
o  to receive a person: Doctor, I have come to see you, because ..
o  to attend as a spectator: I saw a show on TV.
•  to find out, to detect: Suddenly I saw the whole picture, how it all
fits together
o  to investigate: I have to look into that
o  to examine: let me see if I can detect a meaning in this
o  to have or obtain knowledge or experience: She has seen a lot
of life
•  to form mental pictures
o  to reflect: Let us look at this in a new light
o  to imagine oneself able to create images of situations and/or
possibilities: I can see you as an actress in a year or two
•  to understand: I see your point of view
o  to make sense, oh yes I can see what you mean12
“To see” has a plurality of connotations, many of which are more
or less synonymous with obtaining knowledge, insight, imagining
and making sense. It stresses the priority of vision in our lives. We
do not say: Let us hear whether we can smell some sense in this.
Nor  does  any  other  sense  get  the  same  positive  press,
metaphorically speaking, as sight. Smell is suspicious, “I smell a
rat”. Taste is a matter of opinion, which cannot be discussed. Nor
should “we believe all what we hear”. Thus by implication, only
sight is to be trusted: “I see what I see”
Only  one  other  sense,  feeling,  shares  a  similar  range  of
connotations as in “I feel there is something wrong in all this”.
There are no rules, yet it seems that seeing is more related to an
intellectualistic self-identification, whereas feeling is related to our
emotional side as a not equally valued source of information.
Intellectuals, including philosophers of knowledge, apparently
consider “the faculty of sight “ to be more valuable or trustworthy
as a source of information than what wehear, smell or feel. It is as
if  the  passivity  of  being  at  a  distance, and consequently less
involved, is assumed to make one better as a witness.
This may seem fair enough. Seeing is not like feeling, although
both activities have a cognitive as well as evaluative dimension. In
either case, you have to recognize what is happening in front or
within you before you can appreciate it. But at a glance it seems
easier to see what is without feeling something for it, whereas
evaluation is integrated in feeling.16. This though will not do for
the field researcher. Observing is, as we shall see, fraught with
unnoticed evaluations in terms of identification of significance17,.
But yes,it is much easier to identify whether the feelings aroused
in us are pleasant or not. So distance matters. Looking at what
takes place in front of you may not motivate you to do something,
unless what happens activates you to feel something. Emotions stir
you  to  act,  including  searching  for  particulars  whereas  mere
looking does not. True, but this does not entail – as indicated – that
observing can be neutral, because what you identify as worth to
                                                   
16
17   18 Looking normally entails looking at something. Merely looking is
possible  according  to  the  Buddhist,  but  it  takes  years  of  prolonged
meditation practices to see without identifying.13
look at is driven by your evaluative schemes as well as by the
identifications you are able to make. 18
This discussion has essential consequences for interpretation,
which we later will have to touch upon. So for now, let us just take
the next step from sensation to ideas according to the empiricists.
Induction: From facts to nomothetic rules or empirical relations
However you define research, identification and aggregation of
facts, comparisons, explorative search for contingent conditions
and determination of the validity of theoretical claims will be part
of  it.  For  some  types  of  research  defensive  moves  against
alternative modes of interpretation may be included.
Thus one may ask what makes research special in relation to our
daily ways of muddling through life. Personally, I do not think
research differs in principle. It is more a question of degree. The
researcher is just or should be more
o  conscientious in the search for, generation and handling of facts
o  watchful, in terms of looking for alternative interpretations
and/or explanations
o  self-aware of oneself as a registrant and actor, and thus under
an obligation to be as explicit as possible.
Yet, the same challenges have to be met by a lot of people in
industry and the service sector. In practice I believe there is a hell
of  a  lot  more  “honesty”  in   the  design,  construction  and
maintenance of airplanes, than in most book on organizational
design!
Some assert that it is the combined systematic approach and
level  of  theoretical  and  practical  insight  that  constitute  the
difference between everyday approaches to inquiry and research.
Thus, one is far more inclined to let a medical surgeon remove a
bullet from inside one’s head than any barber. We simply trust
that the medical doctor has greater foresight of the consequences
of alternative ways of cutting through skull and tissue.
If so, the ability to piece new theories together, test them, as well
as to develop new practices on this ground is what makes the
difference. Social and natural theories evolve after years of not just
inspired  speculation,  but  vigilance,  comparisons  and  tested14
practices  as  well.  So  let  us  just  throw  a  glance  at  these  three
sources.
Catching facts and turning them into data
Fact is derived from Latin “facere”, to produce as in manufacture,
to  make  by  hand.  So  per  definition  facts  are  something  we
generate.  As  we  use  the  term  “fact”  we  thus  implicitly  and
positively acknowledge our responsibility for what we identify.
Data are derived from Latin “dare”, to give, and are thus to be seen
as  something  given.  Data  purport  to  represent  what  exists,
whether someone becomes aware of them or not. Accordingly,
positivists claim that scientific observations, if to be ranked as
data, must be measurable by everybody, if looked at in the same
“right disengaged non-emotional” way”. Or, as the saying goes,
data have to be “objective”. Unlike facts, data are thus perceived as
representing the given in a form uncontaminated by the human
personality behind the eye lens.
So what is right is a question of a theory for measurement. For
the expansion of metals, the data – implicitly defined according to
the prevailing language of Physics – would be “kind of metal”,
“temperature”  and  “coefficients  for  extension”.  They  are
measurable, but not in any way independents. Nor are they just
“observables” in the common sense. Any kind of metal, its exact
temperature or increase in length, cannot at all just be identified
solely  by  observation.  It  requires  instruments:  instruments
designed according to the prevailing language and technological
level of physics. So not even physical data are just given to us.
They too are generated and detected through “lenses” designed by
us according to what a given language of science tells us is worth
looking for. And for a good realistic reason too, as demonstrated
by countless valuable e.g. bi-metal instruments for measuring
temperature.
But there is another problem of which many may not even be
aware: What we observe may not in a scientific sense be true at all
and thus acceptable as data. Children learn that the sky is blue.
Yet, the sky is black, night and day. It only appears to be blue due
                                                   
20  This view is to be rejected by phenomologists, who will claim anything to
be as it appears to be. The sky is blue when I see it as thus.15
to the refraction of sunlight in the atmosphere20. And of course we
do know that appearance is not everything. Hills, townscapes and
other sceneries appear in a vague grayish color from a distance,
yet we do know they may have more clear and distinct colors
when we approach them. It all depends on whether you look at it
at close range or from a distance. Like the profound difference in
sense of concreteness between Personal Psychology and Classical
Sociology!
An  example:  Walking  along  the  road  in  a  minor  village  in
France you may sense the perspective. Yet there is none. We are
not able to perceive depth beyond six meters, but many of us
certainly do experience it. This is an acquired ability! And if you
doubt it, take a look at nineteenth-century Japanese paintings or
European pre-renaissance paintings! And, if still in doubt, recall
the impression on your mind of an open landscape covered in
haze!
So we do not merely see.21 First, seeing implies “knowledge”. A
stool is for sitting and so may a stone occasionally. A throne is for
sitting too, but far more than that. It is an expression of power! Yet,
if I do not know and as a result I amunable to make the distinction,
I may see the throne as just a fancy chair. Secondly, “seeing”
implies relying on what – from our position – appears us to be the
case. In this sense the earth is really flat.
Data, like things and relations, exist22 because we – you and I –
identify them as such. This distinction, however simple, has led
philosophers to wonder whether what we cannot see or even just
do not look at, may exist. To a realist23 this is pure nonsense, but it
may make sense in at least two senses:
•  something may exist and be sensed as such, but it cannot be
identified before we have words to name them;
•  we cannot be certain that what may be sensed may be there, if it
is not brought to the attention by someone.
                                                   
21 To “see” is here used metaphorically as an umbrella concept for hearing,
smelling, feeling through the skin, etc
22 To “exist” has a lot of connotations. Here it is used in the everyday sense.
But we will soon take truth under consideration.
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Philosophy has struggled with these two issues for hundreds of
years, especially in relation to induction. A discussion I will try to
make short:
First, it is as if we cannot talk or identify anything without
naming  it,  so  existence  seems,  in  this  sense,  to  depend  on
language. Yet, all sorts of, say, feelings may make themselves felt
in our body. And while we do know of them, we may still be at a
loss to name them. If so, without a proper vocabulary it is indeed
difficult for us to make others get a sense of what we feel. Just as
we  ourselves  may  be  at  a  loss  so  far,  we  cannot  identify  our
feelings nor sense what they may be trying to express. We are even
more at odds, as the English, German and French languages do not
share the same range of vocabulary for identifying emotions. Thus
we most conclude: Existence does not depend on naming. Certainly
chimpanzees can feel anger as a dog may feel joy, even though
they have no words for it. But even worse:
•  what is observable exhausts the power of languages.
It is just a tiny part of what can be observed and could have been
given a name which actually has one, for instance different cross-
breeds  of  dogs  or  facial  expressions,  different  situations  that
release specified emotions in certain types of persons. Nor do we
have names for different types of snow, shapes of tree crowns or
kinds of understanding, etc.
This leads us to the second point: Epistemology may thrive on the
metaphor of seeing as a common indicator for observation. Yet, the
world does not disappear when we turn our back to it or close our
eyes. As far as sensing, we do not just rely on seeing, but also on
sound, smell and touch.
Thirdly, “existence” is in itself “just a concept”. If we did not
employ the term, who would care? Existence just is and as such it
embraces us.
So  it  may  implicate  us  in  lesser  difficulties  should  westop
talking about data and stick to facts. Still I think we could benefit
from  employing  the  two  terms  as  they  express  two  different
positions.  If  so,  data  are  facts  perceived  and  valued  as  solid
enough to be seen as signs for what there is to see.17
Given this, while at the same time honouring prevailing forms
of speech, we therefore suggest the notion that
•  primary data are facts we ourselves have a) directly observed, b)
and by our own means converted to text, which we now c)
believe in some way to be signs that refer to and embrace a
reality, most likely, may a skeptic add, because they d) fit with
what we otherwise believe in. These are different from:
•  facts, secondary data handed down to us in the form of texts,
figures and tables which we accept to be trustworthy signs for
what may be or once was.
So even though some researchers claim that data are found, we
have to insist that data are generated according to rules we trust or
experiment with, implicitly as well as explicitly. In either case we
are responsible for presenting them as such.
Induction – a tribute to speculation
Thus we come to one of the fundamental tenets of science: The
drive towards explaining by aggregation of facts, comparisons and
generalization. I am aware of the fact that some social researchers,
especially case workers, claim they could not care less, because we
study the unique. But there is no trap door: even the tiniest and
most elementary case cannot be presented without words and
concepts we already share. Thus we cannot avoid the issue, we
have to deal with generalities.24
Bear  in  mind  that  generalizations  –  including  those  of  the
natural sciences – are not definitively provable, but are made at the
risk  that  in  time  new  evidence  may  undermine  them.  Let  us
assume that you have cooled down a number of liquids and seen
them all shrink after solidifying, then you may be tempted to
conclude that any liquid – including those you have not tested –
will shrink when cooled and expand when heated. Yet it cannot be
universally true. Organic materials do not expand, but shrink and
                                                   
25 If opus operandi is adequately defined, “if y then x” may be expressed as
“x may be caused by y” i.e “an increasingly colder environment causes
liquids to freeze”. Yet as a social researcher I – like Hume – am not so fond of
talking about non-observables like causes.   For a discussion of this matter
refer to Tom L. Beuchamp & Alexander Rosenberg: Hume and Problem of
Causation, Oxford University Press, USA, 1981.18
decompose when heated. So you limit your claim to be valid for
inorganic materials.
This example may serve as an illustration of one of the claims of
a prominent philosophy of science, Logical Empiricism: Science is
built on induction:  expanding  what  has  been  observed  for  a
number of repeated instances to be taken as generally true.
Induction  is  not  a  principle  unique  to  science:  Situations
everywhere that repeat themselves are taken as signs of what we
can expect to happen. Being observant we soon learn to accept
“swallows flying low” as a forecast for rain, even though we may
not  know  why.  Habitually  it  only  takes  six  incidents  of  “x
following y”, before we expect if “y” is observed, then “x” will
happen. Experience is a great teacher and apt to teach as well as to
betray us. If we do not do our outmost to classify and define y and
x, as well as to identify under what circumstances, named opus
operandi, we can expect “if y then x”.25
Induction is an example of how science is an extension and a
further refinement of selected everyday detection and habits of
inference. And thus induction may be incorrect, as i.e. the “law of
expansion” mentioned above. H2O does not shrink but expands
when frozen. If it did not, we would have been deprived of the
almost weightless joy of ice-skating!19
Figure 3: INDUCTION
Sentences about




in the form of
discrete
observations
or they may, due to certain internal likeness,
•  bearranged  into  classes  of  aggregate  statements  which  you
eventually may decide to
•  integrate/condense by induction into an empirical law. A law,
which when first stated can be used to infer what could happen
later under similar circumstances, named opus operandi.
Induction is thus more than sheer accumulation of data: It is the
establishment of a rule you are inspired to and dare ground in the
evidence available.
Yet there is – as Hume taught us26 – a more serious problem with
induction. There is nothing beyond God to ensure that what has
happened in the past will repeat itself with the same regularity in
the  future.  And  certainly  there  is  no  logical  guarantee!  Yet
experience shows us that we can trust induction. Believe me, the
sun will rise once more and shine for us tomorrow, and should the
day come when she does not, we are facing a much more severe
question than whether induction can be trusted or not.
To induce is to claim something to be more than just an incident:
It is to rate a series of observations as an exemplar of what may not
merely happen but what will happen again, given the specified
opus operandi. Furthermore I place myself as the guarantor. So in
everyday life the problem of induction has a pragmatic solution:
“If it works, it works as far as we know”!
                                                   
26 David Hume: An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, (1748) Gateway,
Ill, 1956.20
Induction as a dual motion
To  induce  is  to  construct  pictures  of  generality  based  on
identification of singular cases, and as such fraught with problems
as  you  rely  on  what  you  believe  to  be  the  case  –  be  it  naïve
observations, justified beliefs or profound personal convictions.
Induction illustrates how exposed we are to our own whims. Thus
we, as the case researcher working in an explorative mode, should
occasionally take time to challenge the foundations of our initial
assumptions. In this way induction becomes a dual motion, both
forwards  as  an  integrative  principle  and  backwards  as  an
exploration of the proper opus operandi.
Classification
As facts are to be converted into data, classification becomes a
challenge.  Today  we  take  liquids,  metals,  mammals,  etc.  for
granted. That is how we were taught to classify. So it is important
to remember that this is not a necessary move. “Mammal” is but a
present-day classification, which replaced the former division of
animals into: a) tame animals, like chicken, cows, donkeys and b)
wild animals, like mosquitoes, fish, snakes, tigers, etc.27 Mammals
do not exist apart from being a classification. What exists is what I
refer to by drawing your attention to, be it the woman I call my
aunt; that seal on the reef; the pair of porcupines living in our
shed, etc.
The awareness that words like wild, good and true, as well as
concepts like Love, Aunt and Fatherland, are human inventions
and not something that exist independent of the human mind, was
already  formulated  in  the  Middle  Ages28  in  opposition  to
Platonism29.  Classifications  are  inventories  of  names,  which
                                                   
27 The older distinction exemplifies the use of the relevance criteria, while the
new one is scientific in the sense of establishing some criteria of the “we –
the scientists – know better” type, which the rest of us accordingly have to
learn to comply with.
28  ref.  to  William  of  Ockam  1285-1349  and Rochelin 1045-90 as obscure
forerunners. A most important recognition and rejection of Platonism that
remains with us today as part of the Social Constructivist ethos, refer as
well e.g. to Nelson Goodman or Jacques Derrida.
29 Platonism as a philosophy of life states that ideals, say, such as goodness,
are partly hidden as realities in ourselves. Our goal is to get in contact with
them and let them emerge.21
children have to learn in order to make themselves intelligible to
adults and later their peers. Once invented, they are generally
transferred to us with the same ease as the notion of God, which
our  parents  introduced  us  to  for  worship:  a  position  called
Nominalism.30
The use of classifications – like “liquid”, “mammal” or “tame” –
is  subject  to  such  distinct  rules  that  some  take  them  to  be
indisputable. Whereas others like “nation”, “values” or “empathy”
admittedly have far wider bands of significance. A vagueness that
make them all that easier to bring into play! What an advantage!
We just plunge into conversations, assuming the other share our
conception of these words, if we indeed do have one.
Yet, at closer look, we have to acknowledge that concepts, like
“free  will”,  indeed  are  abstruse  and  probably  more  linked  to
certain usage than to any precise inner or outer world reference.
Thus, in order to grasp the meaning of concepts like “goodness”,
“free will”, democracy, etc., the best first strategy may not be to
find out “what it is” at all, nor how it originated, but to explore
who uses the phrase, when and how. Thus, the meaning of a
classification is nothing absolute in itself. It all depends on the
context.
The ethos of Nominalism is thus twofold:
•  to remind us not to confuse the name with what it may refer to, or in
more  catching  terms  not  to  confuse  “the  signifier  with  the
signified”.
Love is a relation between people, not an entity that should be
treated as if it might exist in isolation. And so is truthfulness, as we
shall see illustrated in the next chapter! And secondly,
                                                   
30 Universalis sunt nomina = Universals are (nothing but) names.
34  See  also  Kenneth  J  Gergen:  Realities  and  Relations  (1994), Harvard?
University Press, 1997, page 146.22
•  to  warn  us  against  the  fallacy  of  assumed  concreteness34  or
reification35:  to  believe  and  talk  as  if  something  exists  just
because a language has a word for it.
Classifications saturate our perceptions of the world, including
ourselves, and thus in consequence how we come to perceive and
treat others. The world changes according to the classifications we
are either led to use or choose to use. But only partly! We still have
to distinguish between names and existence. To exist implies the
ability to make a presence felt, preferably in more ways than just
one, including at best even to be “touchable” either a) directly as
my wife’s kisses assure me she is much more than just a dream,  or
b) indirectly, as we assume the stars of the sky would materialize
as fiery entities, provided we were close enough.
Existence  and  identification  and  thus  language  are  partly
independent. A lot of names do not have any clear reference to the
touchable. On the other hand, what exists may at times alert you to
make its presence felt independently of whether you are able to
identify it by name or not.
                                                   
35 Also called hypostatization: to attribute existence to something that does
not exist independently of us – moral concepts, for instance.
37 Carl Hempel and Paul Oppenheim: The Logic of Explanation (1948) reprinted
in Herbert Feigl and May Brocbeck: Readings in the Philosophy of Science,
Appleton-Century-Croft, 1953, paraphrase, page 319.23
To explain ..
is to answer the question “why?”
rather than only the question ”what?”37
From  nomothetic rules  – derived  from observations – to theoretical
expressions
Natural laws state what may not only be expected but will happen
under a given set of circumstances – something we have decided
to  put  our  faith  in  and  take  for  granted,  despite  Hume’s
skepticism. This is also the case for a nomothetic rule38 or what is
called a “law” in the social sciences.
And a law is just a law, nothing but! Apples fall, when the stem
breaks.  Sure,  as  do  a  lot  of  things.  Yet,  Aristotle  turned
observations like these into a principle, as he explained: “Falling to
the ground is the natural thing for heavy things like stones, apples
ect”. This, of course, is just a language game. Yet, many a social
researcher uses the very same trick, if he for instance just states
that oppressed and hungry people nurture a natural, ingrained
grudge against the privileged and well fed.
 Aristotle wanted to “explain” why the world is as it is by means
of language. Imagine what would have happened if Aristotle had
known of balloons? At a glance they look like ordinary objects, but
nevertheless they seem to have their natural place up in the air as
if they were captivated angels or stars! Today we should demand
more of research than linguistic cunning.
That some entities expand when heated is generally accepted as
more than just a conjecture, it is a law of nature. But to state that
they expand due to increased internal atomic motion is a theory, be
it an imaginative invention41 to explain the obvious or an idea
founded by reference to experiments and other theories. And if
you prefer, you are welcome just to take it for a weak theory, as
                                                   
38 Nomothetic, from Greek: Nomos = law and tithemi = to establish, meaning
established and customary rules for what to do and expect.
41  As for the “Atomic Theory of Leucippus and Democritus” (both around 5-
400 BC) see for instance G S Kirk, J E Raven and M Schofield: The Pre-
socratic Philosophers, Cambridge, 198324
the good God showed his concern for animal life by making water
expand when frozen.
A law is a rule for what we can expect to happen, while a theory
purports to explain why it does. That is why often practitioners
and academics do not see eye to eye. People may live an entire life
relying on practical laws of increasing sophistication without any
need for any supportive theory. Why bother about theory if it
works? Academics, on the contrary, want to delve on not so much
how things behave, but why. Why? Well, that is a good question in
itself, isn’t it?
o  In social research the hunt for “why`s” might at best lead us to
reflect  on  whether  other  ways  of  structuring  society  and
organizations  are  possible,  and  what  might  be  the
consequences.
o  At worst it may furnish us with a vain sense of the power of
knowing.
o  Or even tempt us to explain what we really do not know, like
journalists  who  are  expected  to  make  yesterday’s  events
intelligible  to  their  readers.  Imagine:  to  be  able  to  explain
everything, yet still be unable to predict what will happen
tomorrow!
Research-based theory has to have a base in records of what has
happened as well as an idea that the same phenomena still can be
expected to happen under given circumstances. But to theorize
requires more than the sheer accumulation of observations. You
add a supposition of why it is so, based on concepts borrowed
from other theories, analogy, imagination, or what you wish to see
as the operating reality of the apparent reality:
The Greek Master Thinkers were haunted by a paradox: how to
reconcile the fact that the visible world is in constant change, and
what  really  is,  must  be  ever  persistent  and  unchanged.  The
dilemma was – at least on the face of it – finally solved when
Democritus suggested that everything was composed of a small
number  of  minute  particles  with  hooks  so  they  could  lock
themselves  together  in  lumps  as  well  as  forming  new
configurations.42  And  he  used,  he  believed,  a  semantically
                                                   
42 See G S Kirk, J E Raven and M Schofield, op cit25
convincing analogy to back his theory: The world is composed of
atoms just like words are composed of the same limited number of
letters.
This, of course, did not prove the existence of atoms. It was a
captivating theoretical attempt to show that one could explain how
change  is  possible,  and  yet  what  really  exists  may  remain
unchanged.
Much social theorizing is also based on analogies, for instance
comparing firms (organizations) with mechanic systems or organic
entities.
Analogies suggest that something we want to explain works like
something we are familiar with. As a student of philosophy I
attended a presentation by a guest lecturer from Finland. He had
noticed that when adults, after years of absence, revisited the place
where they had grown up, the trees and the garden appeared to be
smaller than they remembered. Because, he explained, information
is stored in the brain and accumulates as raisins run into a sack:
the first settles at the bottom, the latest at the top. Thus the first
pieces of information – soft as they are – are squashed under the
weight of the newest pieces of information. So when recalled,
things will appear to be smaller. Well, this explanation stems from
a  time  when  the  Logos  of  Mechanical  Physics,  including
Hydraulics, was esteemed as the foremost science! But in any case
to explain by analogy is to transfer concepts and images already
familiar to us into a new domain. Thus they may later in time be
seen as misleading. The reference for the shrinking of the external
images is most likely our own body and its increased size as we
grow up43.
To sum up, a law is not a theory in itself. A law is a description of
“what may happen to X under given circumstances (opus operandi), C1,
C2,.., if subject to an influence Y”. In order to create meaning man has
an inclination to try to integrate laws into a greater structure of
sentences, as if the same patterns are operative across domains.
                                                   
43   For  the  importance  of  our  body  as  a  reference  for  the  conceptual
structures, see George Lakoff & Mark Johnson: Philosophy in the Flesh, -the
embodied mind and its challenge to western thought, Basic Books, New York,
199926
Like some see “the hands of Gods”, a “procreation drive” or “class
struggle” or behind natural, biological and/or social phenomena.
Man seems to be obsessed with a drive for explaining far beyond
our  actual  powers.  Thus  allow  me  to  suggest  the  following
definitions:
•  Nomothetic rules: Statements about what can be expected if “x”
is conditioned to “y”, without the sufficient clarification of opus
operandi.
People may commit suicide for all sorts of reasons, but under some
circumstances it may be more prevalent within certain groups. We
may tentatively make it a rule of thumb that people with a frail
self-image are more likely to commit suicide if hit by a more or less
self-inflicted social strain – being mobbed for instance. Or, based
upon other incidents, we may further conclude that people prone
to display a strong self-image are more likely to commit suicide if
hit by a self-inflicted social disaster – bankruptcy for instance. This
entails the following definition:
•  Empirical law: Social statements about what can be expected if
“x” is conditioned to “y”, under well-specified opus operandi.
One crucial question remains, however: Is it possible to list the
entire set of opus operandi for an alleged social theory to be
applicable for any such case?
To explain
We will later have to devote an entire chapter to explanations and
theory.44 For the present it should be enough just to state that a)
laws state what can be expected, theories explain why is it so. Yet
we have to admit that sometimes we are only exposed to a corpus
of sentences masquerading as explanations. Explanation requires
reference to something – a world – beyond language itself.
                                                   
44  To be published separately27
Necessary and sufficient conditions
Given our drive towards making sense, it is important to discipline
ourselves  and  bolster  us  against  the  fallacy  of  assumed
concreteness, for instance
•  the fallacy of elevation: to elevate a necessary prerequisite for a
chosen change to be the sufficient condition.
Examples  are  plentiful.  The  first  known  western  philosopher,
Thales, held water to be the foundation for life! Certainly plants
and animals require water, but it takes more than that. Recently
one  more  survey  on  entrepreneurship  could  not  identify  any
shared personality traits, nor any circumstantial evidence that
could explain why some people became entrepreneurs. However,
they found one shared characteristic: People had to be good at
networking in order to succeed as founders of new firms. Probably
a needed but hardly a sufficient ability! Lots of people are good at
networking  without  being  or  even  aiming  at  becoming
entrepreneurs. It is certainly a skill integrators too have to have.
Competent networking may be a necessary, but not in itself a
sufficient,45 prerequisite for entrepreneurship. Thus the following
definition of an operational clarification:
•  Sufficient condition: The one and only requisite for something to
occur the way it does and not otherwise.
•  A  necessary  condition: A state of affairs that – amongst other
things – has to be present for a certain state to follow.
Deduction: From empirical laws to the singular
Creating your own universe by means of deduction
Given the often-mentioned law of expansion, we must conclude
that if what I have in my hand is a stick of metal, it should expand
if heated.
                                                   
45  Leibnitz was the first to conceive the idea of sufficient reasons (and is
paraphrased below). Yet in all fairness Hume was the first to deal with it
seriously. Leibnitz: Monadologie (1720) § 32. as well as Hume: Human
Treatise of Human Nature, Book 1. part 3, (1739).28
Or stated logically: “If you have a law claiming to be valid for all
cases of A, B and C, you should by deduction – as it is called –
conclude how any x, if an A, would behave”.
The following sentence is an example of deduction from law to
incident:  Solid  objects  –  like  stones,  apples  and  the  bodies  of
people – have, as Aristotle taught us, an inborn tendency to be as
close to the ground as possible. So if I have a pea in my hand and I
let it go, it will fall. Obviously three claims are activated
•  a law
•  an identification of which items are to be included
•  an outcome, which in this case even is an observable.
This operation, called a syllogism, was  first  expounded  on  by
Aristotle, see Figure 4:
Figure  4:  A  SINGLE  DEDUCTION  OR  SYLLOGISM  BY
EXAMPLES
Example 1: Example 2:
Law
•  All metals expand
when heated
• Whatever has the power
to  cause  motion,  has  a
soul
Singularity •  X is a metal
• Magnets have power to
cause motion
Expected
behavior X  will  expand  if
heated
Magnets possess souls46
Yet deductions often draw on a combination of laws through more
steps than just one inference, as shown in Figure 4. For instance a
calculation of how much a bi-metal stick will bend if heated from
20  to  36
oC  will  be  based  upon  an  intricate  mathematical
expression.
Another, more relevant example for social research is shown in
Figure 4.1
                                                   
46 Aristotle: On the Soul I, ii, referring to the beliefs of Thales. Animals can
initiate action by themselves, ergo they have a soul. Stones cannot, yet
volcanoes must.29
Figure 4.1: DEDUCTION BY THEORY COMBINATION
•  Authoritarian persons are afraid of listening to the ideas of
others. They want to be confirmed in the belief they already
adhere to! 47, 48.
•  When threatened from the environment, management of firms
will often approach people and ask them to help – for evidence,
see e.g. 49
Authoritarian managers will hurt companies in times of crisis.
Please note that the first sentence is per se a combined statement
assuming that acting as an authoritarian is due to being fearful. If
so  ”authoritarian”  must  be  defined  independently  of  ”not
listening”. If not, the sentence may be a tautology. Or we may
modify it, stating “Some authoritarian persons are ….” and specify
who they are.
Likewise ”crisis” has to be defined by degree and magnitude.
The relevant degree in the above statement refers to companies
having  to  face  changes  of  unforeseen  magnitude  in  their
environment.
Regarding the conclusion, one might by implication infer that
authoritarian leadership may be preferable in other cases, e.g.
when things run smoothly, in other types of crisis or in other social
institutions than market-dependent firms. Please note this is not
stated.
The comments in Figure 4.1 implicitly indicate that deduction in
social  research  must  be  supported  by  strings  of  qualifying,
validated statements. The law mentioned may even be of a limited
                                                   
47 T. W. Adorno et al.: The Authoritarian Personality, (1950) Norton, New York,
1969.  Please  observe  that  the  sentences  per  implication  assume  all
authoritarian persons to be governed by deep-rooted fears. This may just
be the case for some.
48 Irving L Janis: Victims of Groupthink, – a psychological study of foreign-policy
decisions and fiascoes, Houghton Mifflin, Mass 1972.
49  Clinton  Golden  &  Harold  J.  Ruttenberg:  The  Dynamics  of  Industrial
Democracy, Harper, 1942. A
51 John Stuart Mill: System of Logic, Book II: Of reasoning, chapter iii, § 3.30
range and only considered valid for some authoritarian managers.
Such a limited scope is certainly often the case for even the most
popular  assumptions  of  organizational  life,  as  the  following
example will indicate:
High absenteeism is often taken as a sign of dissatisfaction at the
workplace. Or rephrased in more common terms: If the situation at
work makes people feel dissatisfied, they will be reluctant to go
there. Hardly surprising! Yet much social science is built on such
truisms. And the statement is not even true! Workers all around
the world endure or have had to work under the most horrid
conditions. Thus the propositions have to be guarded with an
array  of  well-specified  conditions  to  be  valid.  This  is  usually
forgotten as social researchers implicitly take it for granted that the
culture they live in is the only one worthy of our attention.
Apparently statements of opus operandi are vital as they mark the
range of necessary conditions under which we can rely on a given
proposed “law” to be valid. It is vital for practical guidance. Nor
will the idea of unification of social theories never get off the
ground without the highest respect possible for opus operandi.
Let us take one more look at the challenge of finding out why
people make themselves absent from work: Accepting the nearly
tautological premise that people stay away because they do not
want to come, I would, if asked, search for evidence to uncover
o  the  circumstances  under  which  people  can  be  led  to  do
something they would rather not do, as well as
o  the circumstances under which they can protest, as well as
o  the means and ways of protest that are open to them and at
what cost.
In short back to case studies!
Fieldwork, though, takes time. Deductions are much easier to
work with than induction, as you rely on ideas which people
before you have thought safe enough to apply. But as Mill stated:
“All inferences are from particulars to particulars”.51 Therefore,
one  cannot  circumvent  comparing  opus  operandi  of  past  and
present. You still have to search for the foundations, working
backwards through the genesis of the theories chosen, exploring
from which historical setting they emerged and what may have
changed since.31
If, in due time, we should achieve a good grasp of the laws for the
social domain, we– just like engineers – would be able to forecast
the behavior of individuals, groups or members of cultures.52 As
legislators, this was what the old Greek philosophers aimed at, as
they formulated constitutions for new city states to be settled
along the shores of the Mediterranean or the Black Sea. Swayed by
their  successes,  including  the  establishment  of  appropriate
religious cults – for instance the one to support the Ptolemaic
conquerors of Egypt – they began to wonder whether nature – like
organizations of men – could be subject to its own set of laws.53
Figure 5: A FOURFOLDED RESEARCH UNIVERSE
Social  research  statements  of  fact
may  be  expressed  as  descriptions
based  upon  plain  language  or
expressed  through  specific  terms
according  to  each  school  of
thought..
Just as sentences may be directly founded on empirical facts or
indirectly on aggregated induced concepts.
   Thus we get this four-folded universe for facts and/or statements
The full circle
Summing up, induction and subsequently deduction forms a full
circle, as illustrated in Figure 6. Collections of particular data are
by induction generalized into laws, and if supported – by analogy
for instance – established as a theory. Subsequently the theory may
be used to deduce what we can expect to find under well-defined
conditions of opus operandi. A positive outcome will be taken as a
confirmation  of  the  law,  whereas  a  negative  one  obviously
requires  an  adjustment  of  the  law  and  the  theory  that  was
supposed to contain it, including our research to be more specific
with regard to opus operandi.
                                                   
52  This of course assumes there may be such laws. This assumption will be
discussed later in an upcoming chapter to be published separately.
53 For a fascinating overview, see Benjamin Farrington: Greek Science, UK,
1944.32
Figure 6: THE FULL CIRCLE: CONDENSATION OF DATA TO
LAWS  SUPPORTED  BY  THEORY  IS  A  MEANS  TO  DEDUCE
WHAT  WE  MIGHT  OBSERVE  UNDER  SPECIFIED
CIRCUMSTANCES
1: Induction requires facts as well as confidence. It is a decision
made relying on intuition54 and the evidence chosen.
2: Such a rule may later, as an empirical law, be converted into a
theory, if what the law claims to be “true” can be expressed and
made  to  fit  with  a  greater,  preferably  pre-established,  set  of
theories
3: Having established a set of theories, we may in turn use them to
deduce what will happen.
                                                   
54 Intuition is a form of a felt assurance, which in the best cases builds on a
feel for accumulated experiences, and at worst on make-believe.33
4: Finally, experiments may be set up to explore to which degree
derived expectations will fit new sets of data generated – a Theory
Test.
Thus we get a fourfold universe of sentences – either descriptive or
of a conceptually condensed type – claiming to be valid either by
resort to strings of observations, successive comparisons and/or
domains of theories.
In  case  of  a  more  exploratory  approach  where  we  want  to
approach  an  uncertain  field  and  to  explore  it,  as  well  as  to
challenge our expectations, the set-out may be a vision of the
expected,  integrating  several  theories  into  a  whole,  e.g.,  as  a
scenario.
Further epistemological challenges, - a bird’s eye view
Realism:
On the outlook for a reality that may be lurking behind the manifest
The discussion so far has explicitly or implicitly referred to various
epistemologies. One of these being realism, cf. Figure 7, based on
the idea that
•  the apparent domain of observations is an expression of an
underlying reality, and that
•  this reality will “make itself heard” if – based on the data we
generate  –  we  construct  too  deviant  images  to  fit  a  set  of
specified opus operandi.
And indeed, if we pause and reflect, we must accept “underlying”
realities to exist, whether we hitherto have recognized them or not.
Most of the functions within our body are phenomenologically
unknown to us. We have heard or read about them and may as
such take their existence for granted. Yet, sitting here in front of
my Mac, I have no means of proving that what surfaces in my
mind is the result of processes within my body. I believe it is, yet it
may be due to telepathy by intervention of Gods. If so “God”
constitutes the underlying reality. Now we have to be careful and
not let us be seduced by either-or thinking. Certainly – if you want
to believe it – some of our inner motions may be due to God,
whereas others may just be contained within the body.34
Neurologists and other experts may have more or less founded
ideas about how and why we react as we do. However, for most of
us, the existence and functions of our brain, glands, intestines and
neurological system are just hearsay, something we have read
about just as we may have read about religious practice in the
Stone Age.
We live on the surface of at least two realities: the one around
us, and the one within us. How these realities take form for us is
partly shaped by language. Thus some – but certainly not realists –
are  led  to  state  that  our  sense  of  reality  is  totally  shaped  by
language.
Structuralism
Structuralism, as a sociological philosophy, is built on 1) the fact
that our conceptions of the world are not just dependent on but
structured through language; 2) that languages in themselves are
structured  wholes  in  which  every  word  is  sustained,  if  not
definable, by other words. Just look at any dictionary! Thus it is a
deception, when we – as language users – assume that words
should have a reference to either outer or inner realities. Their
primary reference is to the language as a whole.
As we know, languages “create” each their own possible world
out of what is given. This is more than amply illustrated by the
broad  span  of  different  connotations and  values –  within  our
western languages – related to the identification of emotions and
feelings.  Thus,  we  need  to  place  ourselves  outside  any  given
language just to get an idea of its forming capacities.  If not, the
words we use will shape our world, including our experiences of
ourselves as persons. To see how and whether we acquire such a
stand will have to wait for a later chapter. But we all know of
situations where we have run out of words in order to give a
proper report of something we felt or had “in our mind”.
True, language can easily lead us astray, and indeed it may be
hard  for  us  to  acknowledge  the  grip  of  language  on  our
consciousness – how our ideas about life are shaped by technology
–  the  tools  we  use,  the  climate  we  live  in,  etc.55  And  as
circumstance  change  with  the  ways  we  earn  our  living  and
                                                   
56 For a crucial example during my fieldwork and the personal insight it
aroused in me about “behaviorial therapy”, please refer to The Employee
Owner, page (Phil B) and page …35
relations to others, so may our language. And we may not even
notice  it  ourselves  as  it  happens,  whereas  it  may  come  as  a
surprise to people who meet us after a while and may bring it to
our attention.56
This has led radicals to wonder whether we could create not
only  living  conditions  but  also  languages  that  could  have
emancipatory rather than ideologically unhealthy consequences
for us, including leading us into never-ending debates over no-
things. This is the view of spokespersons for Critical Theory.57
Whereas conservatively-oriented thinkers, like Gadamer,58  are
more  inclined  to  stake  their  fate  on  traditionally  well-proven
thought schemes and take the vain efforts of practical socialism as
a warning towards unfounded utopianism. Yet to me the language
of social research certainly does need a revision. I even hope to
demonstrate how.
In any case, the grip of language on how and what we see and
what we tell others is undeniable. The question is whether we can
sense and feel this grip – and how. And as we shall see, case
studies could be conducted in a way that at least can make us
attentive to the very idea. And so may a greater attention to our
emotional life, as alluded to in Figure 7.
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58  Hans-Georg Gadamer: Truth and Method (1960) Sheed and Ward, 1965
60 Individual emotions may be defined by referring to situations where they
occur. But researchers seem at loss to agree how to define them in general.
Some align emotions with feeling or outbursts of feeling, others with
negative feelings. In any case we identify them as movements in our body.36
Figure 7: REALISM ASSUMES THAT WHAT WE OBSERVE
IS AN EXPRESSION OF UNDERLYING REALITIES,
– EVEN THOUGH ASPECTS OF THE REAL MAY BE BEYOND
OUR REACH
The  major
part  of  the
processes in
our  body  is
unknown to
us. If we had
not  been
told about
 kidneys, we would not know about them. I have never felt their
presence within me. Probably they are there as sure as the heart,
which  I  do  feel.  And  certainly,  I  am  grateful  that  the  potential
myriad of messages about internal states is blocked away from my
potential awareness as by an internal filter!
    The reason why I believe I know of them is partly due to reading,
partly to later gained experience including training in increased
bodily awareness. Apparently language in itself implicitly structures
our  ideas  of  what  is  in  and  around  us,  even  though  what  it
occasionally may refer to is hidden to us. Yet, I do know of kidneys,
happily not my own, though, as I as a farmer have slit dozens of pigs
open, and seen that they at least contain them.
Emotions60 too have a life of their own within our bodies. Contrary
to  well-functioning  kidneys  they  do  may  make  themselves  felt,
either directly as tensions, states of pleasure or indirectly thru the
thoughts and fantasies they trigger in us. Yet we can suppress them
in the sense of blocking them off from our awareness, making it all
the harder for us to understand the messages they convey.
     On the other hand, even when we open ourselves to feel our
emotions,  we  may  not  always  be  able  to  label  them  with  the
precision we might want to. Nor do the names for emotions have the
same range of meaning in English and German. But they push to
make themselves felt. Thus we just have to look into ourselves – and
even at times go beyond the domain of words – to make sense of the
realist ethos.37
Idealism and Romanticism
Idealism is a striking contrast to both structuralism and realism.
On the one hand, idealists claim that our world is constituted by
the way we think. Thus, there is no independent reality as such.
On the other hand, though, they believe it is up to us to shape our
language, not language to shape us, as a structuralist would claim.
The world is as I imagine it. Whether the world will accept it, is
another matter.
Social  constructivism  is  linked  to  idealism  as  it  claims  that
language constitutes “reality” as it appears to us. Our world takes
shape  through  the  words  we  apply.  Accordingly,  social
constructivists  emphasize  the  role  and  effects  of  social
interchanges. A most useful approach! This carries one important
implication: While we cannot control our feelings, it may still be
sees as up to us to decide how to cope with them after they have
surfaced. Coping requires reflection, which most likely, if not
entirely61 then at least to a high degree, depends on the concepts
we have acquired.
Romanticism is, I believe, located somewhere between idealism and
realism, depending on how you look at it. Romanticists go beyond
language and claim to be able to sense a greater or lesser part of an
underlying reality, which we share with the rest of living matter.
Reality easily escapes plain language, but we can indeed feel it.
Yet, where ordinary language fails, poetry may give you a sense of
such a vision. Others, though, claim that the visions of romanticists
are more felt than real and thus merely artful constructions.
If you – as a Buddhist for example – believe it is possible to
sense reality directly – that is without language as an intermediary
– romanticism falls within the realist category.
There is only one world, but we all live in our own
I will grant you – if empiricist – that there is no logical reason to
suppose  that  our  impressions  emanate  from  something,  say
external. Logic has nothing to do with existence. It is a question of
interrelations between sentences.
                                                   
61 Often drawings may be an even better alternative to try to come to terms
with the inherent message conveyed in the outbreak of feelings, dreams
etc. Why? Because, drawing neutralizes the guiding imaginary of linguistic
expressions!38
So let us forget Hume and stick to realities. Not only is there a
world external to our minds, our bodies are also part of it. We are
enmeshed in the external and thus to each other. So we had better
– as soon as possible – learn to distinguish between the signals we
sense inwardly, those we project outwards to others, and the e-
motions alive within us. There are more within us than anybody
can observe.62
Thus by analogy we have reason to assume that other people
have an inner life too, just as we have all the reason to believe that
the world does not disappear just because we close our eyes, as
long as we remain in touch with it through our body.
Summing up, allow me to state my realist ethos: There is only one
world, but we all live in our own. Thus the search for truth becomes a
challenge as great as ever.
                                                   
62 This is by no means a denial of the fact that the most sensitive observers
might “see” what we ourselves are not aware of, nor the e-motions we are
trying to keep to or even from ourselves.39
TRUTH
 – a concept of imagination with many faces
The counterfactual as an inspiration
An apple fell. Why? Well, Aristotle explained – or, as I see it, he
rephrased – the obvious by stating that heavy objects are drawn to
the ground. Just like we may presume that the man on the corner
is eating a doughnut because he is hungry.
In contrast, Newton, as he sat under the apple tree, wondered:
“Say the stem broke, what would it take to make an apple move
horizontally? Like the moon moves along a tangent around the
earth! Well, the apple had to be kept in place by something like a
string and swung. And this string, however invisible, Newton
christened gravity.
Thus, it was not just observation, but contra-factual imagination
that  led  Newton  to  develop  the  Mechanical  Physics.  A  truly
creative invention!63
Thus the development of even a most significant theory does not
necessarily hinge on massive accumulations of data, nor on an
exquisite number of cases. What really matters is the ingenuity
and sixth sense of the researcher. Whether such an intuition will
stick and if so for how long, is a matter for continued empirical
research. Within science truths do seem to stick for generations.
Within  social  research,  though,  another  strategy  than  those
pursued at present will have to be developed before we can even
imagine  that  we  might  move  towards  the  same  kind  of
universality as science. For the social domain truth is not so much
a  question  of  what  may  be  the  case  for  a  certain  period  as  a
question of what people want to believe, be it theorists relying on
the power of words or pragmatics ready to respond to the pressure
from matter-of-fact reality.64
While  induction  rests  on  the  more  or  less  ingenious
interpretation of the researcher, deduction is a matter of rules and
using  them  correctly.  Thus  deduction  has  often  been  seen  as
unproblematic vis-à-vis induction. This is a misrepresentation. The
                                                   
63  I have related the story as my father told it to me. I have in vain tried to
verify it as well as one of his other stories about Newton, his so-called
fourth law: “When you pee, the last drop will always be in your trousers.”
64   Refer back from interpretation and explanation.40
basis  for  deduction,  law  and  theory  is  ultimately  derived  by
induction. Nor is the world logical. The world just is.
Opus operandi
As we all know, what we might endure or enjoy in small doses, be
it a medicine, alcohol or cyanide, can be harmful to us in larger
quantities, yet we may adapt to tolerate greater amounts. Thus, as
Richet tells us,65 he had never imagined that a substance, which at
first did not harm an organism, could later become poisonous. He
had believed it to be the other way round; that organisms could
adapt  themselves  to  tolerate  stronger  amounts  of  sensitive
material, like alcohol. Yet, to his surprise, a laboratory animal
actually  died  being  accidentally  given  one  tenth  of  an  initial
experimental dose. He concluded: “It was not due to me, but
despite me, I discovered the phenomena of allergy.”66
Thus, the world simply is not logical. So now we – who now
regard allergy as something natural – have become that wiser. Yet,
as  already  stated:  Without  due  attention  to  “opus  operandi”
propositions may not be as valid as they may entice us to presume.
We cannot know whether something, because it has been the case,
is still true. Propositions once advocated as true by a majority may
not  be  true  any  more,  i.e.  Tayloristic  worker-management
relations. But “I” may believe it whether it is out of inner strength
or habit, as Hume pointed out. It is a decision, for instance, to
accept God as the ultimate mover of everything. One may even
say: “X is true because what it states is actually the case”, for
instance that water freezes at 0
0 C, and even add: “I can make an
experiment and show it to you.” In this case this is, by the way, not
possible. If continuously cooled, pure liquid H2O will not turn
solid before at around ÷16
0 C.
                                                   
65 Charles Richet: Le Savant, 1923, Hachette, Paris, page 99-100.
66  Anaphylaxie is the word used in the original text. 67  Performative truth:
Stating something to be true is not to describe anything. I just have to
vouch for it to be the case. Like “getting married” is the performance of
saying yes at the altar. Ref. John Austin: “Other Minds”,XXXX41
Truth? Do not take it for granted that you know what it means!
So  we  found  out  about  allergy.  Apparently  the  truth  of  any
statement is contingent on whether what it expresses corresponds
with reality. People who insist on all that is said to exist is due to
language  alone  –  like  the  structuralists  –  evidently  have  to
challenge this view. Yet, even they do not deny that we in our
daily interchange implicitly assume words to refer to something
outside  language.  So,  “true”  as  the  word  is  used  in  ordinary
speech, it is most likely to state that what is said is the case or,
more modestly, that I believe it to be so.
However,  the  term  “corresponds  with  reality”  does  not  say
anything about what that reality is. And, of course, it cannot. This
is  exactly  what  research  should  uncover  systematically.
Furthermore, if we look upon the amount of literature dealing
with  “what  reality  is  and  how  we  discover  it,”  we  must
acknowledge  that  we  cannot  expect  to  get  away  with  such  a
slipper  dipper  statement.  “Truth”  is  a  multi-facetted  term,  as
illustrated in Figure MFT.
FIGURE  MFT:  THE  MANY  FACES  OF  THE  CONCEPT  OF
TRUTH
Whatever truth is, it has been defined in several ways, primarily
as:
•  personal willingness to insist on what is the case – something
“I” faithfully have committed myself to live and work for. In
English and in its weakest form called performative truth,67
in a stronger German form called ideal truth, while I prefer the
French form: existential truth.
•  correspondence, e.g. that what a sentence expresses is the case.
A  sentence  is  true  if  what  it  expresses  mirrors  a  reality
independent of language!
•  coherence, e.g. that what a sentence expresses fits with a set of
sentences, I already believe to be true, or at least does not
contradict these other sentences. A sentence is true if it fits
with what we otherwise have been led to believe.
•  pragmatically: We will take any statement to be true in so far as
it has served us well as a guidance  for achieving any practical
aim  of  ours.  Thus,  “to  know  is  to  foresee”  –  without
necessarily being able to explain why – what will or at least42
might happen if “Y” – under a given set of conditions – is
exposed to “X”.
The  definitions  above  may  respectively  be  called  existential,
realistic, idealistic and methodological conceptions of truth. Please
notice how three of them refer to something beyond language
itself. If so, truth has to have social implications. Thus cynics have
taken a more sedate view and looked at how and when the word is
used and by whom. If so, “truth” may emerge as
•  inter-subjectivity: true or valid statements are what a plurality
of leading scientists or researchers can agree upon to be so.
•  a power game: truth is what a ruling elite at a given time finds
fit to define as correct or what is best for the rest of us to
accept as such. Or the same with just a slightly different twist:
•  justification for a practice already established. “What I do must
certainly be a better or even the best way to do e.g. research,
so I encourage you to follow suit”, or
•  each  science  is  a  game  with  its  own  rules,  including
conventions for truth.
As sensitive readers may have detected, the cynical versions are
all parasitic, in the sense that they thrive on either the realist or
the methodological conception. To this we will ad another, more
rhetorically refined version:
•  redundancy: “truth”, “exist” and words like these are just
mental, or, as I would say, rhetorical enforcers to stress what I
claim is the case. To claim “x is b” states that it is so. Thus no
additional information is added,68 if I say “it is certainly true
that x is b”, yet it may sound more convincing to underline
what you want to say with “it is certainly true” rather than
the more existential utterance “I will be damned if x is not b”.
These conceptions of truth may partially overlap as well as refer
to  different  dimensions  of  human  life,  thus  they  do  not
necessarily exclude each other.
                                                   
68  Ref. F. P. Ramsey: Facts and Propositions (1927), reprinted in D. H. Meller
(ed.): F. P. Ramsey Foundations, London 1978, page 45. Likewise ”that b is x
is false” appears just to be another way of saying ”b is not X”.43
In the following we shall briefly touch upon all the perceptions




Speech serves many functions, the simplest of which is to draw
our attention to something by referring directly to a thing undone,
an event in the past, your untied shoes or the tenseness aroused in
my stomach as I picked up a rumour on additional budget cuts in
my company. This is called the ostensive69 or instrumental use of
language “Words are ultimately derived as to signify the sensible,”
as we may paraphrase the great empiricist John Locke70. Thus
children are sometimes said to learn the meaning of words by
being told what they refer to: A good person is one who, e.g., helps
small girls or pleases me.71
Yet, not all references are equally unequivocal, nor does every
noun necessarily refer to something; yet, in order to be scientific,
they should.
A great idea: Correspondence between language and reality
Wittgenstein, a young engineer of aero-dynamics, founded his first
reputation as a philosopher on the claim that a language in order
to be scientific should be in a one-to-one correspondence with
reality, “like the gramophone record, the score, the waves of sound
all stand one to one in that pictorial relation which holds between
language and world”.72;73 Such an isomorphic relationship applies,
                                                   
69 Ostentive = to point towards, from Latin: to show
70   John Locke: An Essay concerning Human Understanding (1690), Fontana
Library, 1964. Paraphrased by combining Sentences, Book 2 sub-chapter 1.2
and Book 3 sub-chapter 1.5.
71  refer to John Locke, op.cit., Book 2, sub-chapter 20.2
72  Ludvig Wittgenstein: Tractatus Logicus-Philosophicus (1922), Routledge and
Kegan Paul, sentence # 4.014.
73  Wittgenstein was certainly not the first exponent of the idea, It dates back
to the very dawn of our civilization, Plato, Aristotle, Thomas Acquinas and
Locke  as  mentioned  aboveas  well  as  Wittgenstein’s  master  Bertrand
Russell, who claimed ”that truth consist in some form of correspondence44
e.g.,  to  accounting,  which  –  if  properly  made  –  is  a  gross,
aggregated re-rendering of the flow of material, goods and man-
hours within the firm. A representation that may be illustrated in
discrete sequences, as Jay W. Forrester demonstrated with his
language: Industrial Dynamics.74  Just  as  an  IT-based  tracking
system of today trail and control flows in actual time, see Figure
TS. Or as double bookkeeping was developed around year 1400 to
help  merchants  in  Northern  Italy  keep  track  of  stock  and
shipments of spices.
FIGURE TS: CORRESPONDENCE AS A ONE-TO-ONE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN A CHOSEN REALITY AND OUR
DESCRIPTIONS OF IT
Present-day,  real-time
accounting systems are set
up to trace every change in
the  number  of  items
processed and stored in a
1:1 relationship.
    Likewise  timetables  for
trains  are  condensed  1:1
relationship  of  time  and
geographical space.
Yet, a lot of pre-knowledge is required in order to read such
schedules.  I,  for  one,  would  not,  e.g.,  be  able  to  recognize  a
Chinese timetable as such.
However, structural likeness between text and reality – like the
example of flows in Figure TS – is not generally achievable. First,
in order to grasp anything, one needs to know beforehand what
the issue is. Say, you want to learn a little Danish and I point at
something and I say: “Look hunden there, how it is playing with a
ben,” you may very well grasp the idea that “Hund” and “Ben” is
the Danish words for “ hound” and “bone”. Had I instead just
used Danish words: “Se hunden, hvordan den leger med et ben,”
                                                                                                                                                     
between belief and fact”, ref. Human Knowledge – its scopes and limits, New
York 1948, page 148.
74 Jay W. Forrester: Industrial Dynamics, Wright Allen Press, USA, 1962.45
you would not have been able to grasp anything. Indeed, people
love to make fun of the lack of correspondence between languages
and the realities they claim to represent:
Ackoff75 tells a story about a young American working in Africa
for six months as a substitute for a minister. Trying to be of use, he
paternally pointed towards pots, pans and dogs, naming them in
English. After his return the minister asked the congregation how
things had been. “Oh, the young minister was wonderful”, they
said, “but why did he have so many names for his index finger?”
Apparently not even pointing is sufficient in order to establish
the intended connection between signalling sounds and realities.
Secondly,  neither  in  ordinary  languages  nor  in  aggregated
scientific expressions are there a structured one-to-one relationship
between sentences and what they are believed to refer to. You
might hear yourself saying: “Thou shall love thy neighbour”. Fine,
and  you  probably  should!  Yet,  there  is  hardly  a  one-to-one
relationship between the demand of such a sentence, what you
would do, and the scores of life situations in which it could be
applicable. I, e.g., would steal from anybody in order to feed my
family, violating one further from the Jews derivated duty of mine:
“thou shall not steal”.
So,  even  though  any  statement  may  refer  to  some  cases  of
applicability,  an  extended  list  of  “if´s”  would  be  needed  to
establish the sufficient opus operandi for all cases.
Thirdly,  the  modelling  capacity  of  language  is  strikingly
inadequate. You cannot even describe the general face features of
someone with the sufficient precision that would allow us to pick
her out in a crowd. So, in order to make yourself recognizable to,
e.g., a blind date, you will have to tell her that you will be sitting at
a table outside that cafe, wearing, e.g., a red scarf. Apparently, one
may have to state something absolutely inessential rather than
actual  appearance  to  be  recognizable.  Language  is  grossly
inefficient as a conveyer of information, yet it may work through
selective simplification.76,77
                                                   
75 Russel L. Ackoff: Scientific Method, - optimizing applied research methods, John
Wiley, 1947, page142-6.
7646
Thus, fourthly, it is hardly surprising that we are often at a loss to
just grasp what others might be talking about: “She stood behind
her husband”. What does that imply?
o  Did they stand in a queue?
o  Did they stand back to back, defending each other’s rear?
o  Did she support him through life, meaning that she carried him
– not on her shoulders of course – but metaphorically?
Who knows? We have to know more. Words like signs, including
body  postures,  may  have  multiple  connotations.  They  are,  as
linguistics call it, poly-semical. Meaning grows out of a context, not
just out of any individual sentence or face movement! If so, we
have to be sensitive to the whole, the setting, before we embark on
any interpretation. The words themselves are not enough. Let us
look at one further example of this: Say, you are told:
“THERE IS A HOUSE IN BARCELONA”
Obviously, it has to be so; literally it is a tautology. Towns are
defined as assemblies of houses and other buildings. Thus, in
order for the sentence to be meaningful – to refer to something –
“we” have to, imaginatively, set it in context.
Could the speaker want to stress that one house is still standing
after a war or an earthquake? Maybe! If so, the conversation must
already have dealt with destruction.
If not, the sentence may be a poetical reference to a particular
house. Maybe the home where the informer grew up and where
her parents still live. Or a house may not be a dwelling at all. The
sentence may refer to a princely dynasty.
Sentences may have a meaning beyond what they literally state;
amongst scores of other possibilities, be they ironical, humorous,
metaphorical or poetical expressions. Only context can tell.
And,  last  but  not  least,  “false  statements  are  not  formally
different from true ones”!78 That is exactly why they, even though
they are false, might convince. The same applies to meaningless
statements:  Thus,  an  utterance  like  “the  will  is  free”  gained
                                                                                                                                                     
77 Man has two ears, two eyes, etc. Yet, this does not as any other statistical
fact tell us anything about any concrete human  being.
78 Ref. e.g. Gilbert Ryle: Systematically misleading Expressions (1931), reprinted
in Richard M. Rorty (ed.): The Linguistic Turn, 1967, University of Chicago
Press (1992), page 86.47
currency amongst theologians, albeit it most likely is nonsensical.
People  might  be  free  or  constrained,  but  not  concepts  or
behavioural  patterns.  Ideas  used  to  describe  potential  human
conditions cannot be treated literally as if they could and do exist
as actors in themselves.79 Certainly we may have an idea about
the intended meaning of “the will is free”. If so, this just once more
stresses that at least it is not a “one-to-one” relationship.
There is no likeness or structural relationship between sentences
and reality. Sentences allude to but are not – like some paintings
claim to be – like pictures of dreams and/or reality.
The imaginary powers of language
Even though it has dawned to us that we cannot expect a one-to-
one relationship between a signifying text and the signified, most
people will be at a loss to discard the idea that “the truth of any
statement is contingent on whether what it expresses corresponds
with reality”. And for a perfectly good reason: We normally expect
other people to be honest with us. Language would be not just
meaningless, but also impossible if we could not at all count on the
rapport with and the directions we receive from others.80
The  emergence  of  “new  speak”  therefore  threatens  to  turn
language into a mere means of influencing people, rather than
telling them something they can count on. Yet “new speak” still
thrives on the belief that what is stated should be believable. So,
despite all sorts of untold omissions of facts, twisted arguments,
etc., most of us are still – until proven otherwise – prepared to
trust  the  other  in  face-to-face  encounters.  We  even  –  if  not
otherwise alerted – implicitly take it for granted that people we
meet know what words and sentences they use mean. And if not,
we should – as our forefathers told us – ask for clarification.
Nevertheless, it is one of the wonders of our world that we believe
ourselves able to recognize what descriptions imply in terms of
identifying items, incidents and relations around and within us.
Acquiring a good knowledge of a language is not just a question
of learning words and combining them, but simultaneously to get
a feel for the significance our instructors and later others assign to
                                                   
79 For further clarification, see page ..........XXXXXXXXX.
80   This argument can be read as an example of categorical imperative,
launched by Kant: Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, (1785).48
them. Thus, there is a lot of tacit knowledge involved in learning
languages, ranging from:
•  pronunciation of words like the “i” in mind or mint;
•  using and combining words as we talk, or reflecting upon our
sentences just uttered;
•  meaning of words.
True, there are rules for grammar and pronunciation, but we all
learnt to speak our mother tongue without knowing any. Just as I
have forgotten whatever rules my teacher of English may have
tried to get us to repeat in class as if we were parrots.
The same goes for meaning. If we know the language, we know
what  the  words,  one  by  one,  might  imply,  yet  not  in  any
combination. Meaning is not fixed:
Some words are very specific with a small area of a) semantic
breadth. “Television” is a word with a very fixed meaning. With
other  words,  including  the  most  common  ones,  problems  of
breadth may occur. You and I know what a house is, but what
type of construction is exactly the dividing line between “house”
and “hut”? Surely a cave is not a house, yet caves can be and have
been used for housing for centuries.
Other words, especially more abstract words, have an even
greater span of semantic breadth. We may all share some common
notion of what “love” is. Yet we will probably never agree on what
love is, or whether it refers to something that exists. And, really,
without having experienced it, how could one have a sense of it?
And  what  about  a  concept  like  knowledge?  Is  anyone
knowledgeable enough to define it?
Furthermore,  b)  a  lot  of  items,  situations,  facial  contractions,
emotions  rumbling  around  in  our  body,  different  varieties  of
snow, bends of branches, etc. do not have any name in English. This
sets obvious limits to what we can talk about.
In addition, many words c) seem to have no specific reference81 to
the reality they appear to be relating to, as hinted at by figure IMG.
                                                   
81 Please notice, reference is “correspondence without any specification of
opus operandi49
Not  only  may  the  reference  be  dubious  but  rooted  more  in
ideology82 than in naming:
Amongst the concepts referring to something quite different
from what they appear to be is “free will”! Presumably it says
something about a quality of man or some men. Yet, as I see it, it
points back to a semantic solution to an awkward situation created
by early Christian theologicans, who first defined i) God as a
universally good and omnipotent entity. Only next, having to their
embarrassment  to  face  and  explain  ii)  why  there  is  so  much
suffering, wickedness and human disease around! How could Eve
and Adam have reached out for and taken a bite of the forbidden
fruit of wisdom,83 etc., if God is a good and omnipotent entity?
Because man has a free will, was the answer.84 Semantic ingenuity
may get us a long way!
Today, and despite the fact that the learned members of our
faculties no longer indulge in debates about the essence of God,
the notion of “free will” is still commonly used as an argument for
the individuality and freedom of man. However sound this notion
is as a political manifest, it is empirically fraught with difficulties:
How can we claim to have a free will when many of us cannot
stop smoking nor slim down, even though we say we want to?
“Oh, it is because we do not really want to”, the counter-argument
goes. If so, the notion of a “free will” must just mean we can state
whatever we want to do, regardless of whether we will do it or
not.  Just  as  some  –  without  the  slightest  premonition  of
embarrassment – may claim “man” to be free to conceptually
shape his own world, as he prefers!85
                                                   
82 Ideology in itself is polysemical of course. In neutral terms it just refers to a
body of interconnected ideas, like Empiricism, Realism, Marxism, etc. I
though, tend to define ideology in a negative sense as a body of alleged
knowledge  that  some  people  are  interested  in  defending  at  all  costs,
including disregard for the reality principle.
83  It is a fascinating thought that “doing God’s will” eschews the acquisition
of wisdom, but it is even more fascinating that people do not ask whether
our ancestral couple did acquire it, and if so, how did we since loose it.
84   For a reference to St. Augustin, etc. see, Sidney Morgenbesser & James
Walsh (eds) Free Will, USA 1962.
85  Remember later to introduce the idea, that “free will” may refer to the fact
that 1) we like all other animals do have our own desires, inclinations, etc,
2) but that our ability to evaluate these desires may be more developed50
And even though we all know enough about ghosts to talk
about them. What are they? Something the existence of which
many people deny, yet it scares them to think about it. Is it because
ghosts do not exist they are so scary to some people?
Whatever the answer, language apparently has sufficient inner
coherence to allow us to create images that may have no or at best
a dubious reference to a domain outside language itself and not
necessarily to the one explicitly referred to.
Or is it so that the will to “sense spirits” is a question of one’s
own sensitivity. If so, how can those who lack it allow themselves
to deprive the rest of us of the right to name what we are aware of?
Furthermore, the very ambiguity of language may at times be
cultivated as a source of great delight in itself. Certainly, not
everyone  is  equally  sensitive  to  the  layers  of  meaning,  e.g.
sarcasm,  which  may  or  may  not  hide  themselves  beneath  the
outwardly apparent meaning of speech and writing. So, “x is y”
may actually mean “x is not y”. E.g. talking about the present,
“this is a wonderful chapter”, may be read as an irony by some
people.
Figure IMG: LANGUAGES SET LIMITS FOR WHAT CAN BE
SAID
Language  has  –  as
Structuralism teaches us – an
internal  consistency  of  its
own. Thus, lots of words and
concepts  may  not  have  any
sensible counterpart in reality;
be they relics from now
outdated schemes of thought, which have taken their own form, or
a substantiation of qualities like the forms of Plato.
                                                                                                                                                     
than most.. Thus we can decide to fast and actually accomplish it in order
to achieve some other goals, - goals which we accordingly ranked as
higher, spiritual or whatever. Thus the “free will” may designate that we
may occasionally not give some chosen sets of immediate desires. Yet this
may be misleading too, as the decision of not talking back to the boss may
be more due to cowardice and calculation than actual virtue. 86 Michael
Polaynia: Personal Knowledge, - towards a post-critical philosophy, London
1958 and The Tacit Dimension, 1963.51
It is indeed a wonder how we are able to speak and read – because
we do not know why. Some say it is due to linguistic cunning or
tacit knowledge.86 Yet, such a short, highly aggregated notion can
hardly cover for the intricate mesh of neurological capabilities that
carries  the  apparent  outward  surface  of,  e.g.,  linguistic
competences.  The  “cunning”  expression  is,  rather,  an  indeed
persuasive and condensed cover to help us hide our ignorance
under the appearance of an expert statement. A linguistic trick in
itself!
Summing up: Lack of correspondence is the challenge
Words,  nouns  in  particular,  are  taken  to  be  signs  that  point
towards something. This something may be identifiable as a part
of a reality –   real or imagined – linked to images or just other
words. The problem, though, is that you must, beforehand, have a
sense of what it is, that is pointed at – a conception of what the
meaning might be or at least be able to guess at the risk of being
wrong! Thus, Socrates, time after time, was able to make fun of the
people around him as they tried to define, let us say, courage by
pointing to acts they characterized as such. To him the concrete
may exemplify, yet cannot define the general.
Thus, correspondence between text and the social domain can
never  be  established  with  certainty.  There  will  always  be
something more to state. Correspondence in itself is not a criterion of
truth. It is rather the other way round. What is important is not
whether correspondence can be established, but when it cannot.
Lack  of  correspondence  is  the  challenge.  Correspondence  is  a
necessary, but not a sufficient criterion of trustworthiness.
The  haziness  about  abstract  words  for  ideas,  sentiments  and
feelings is a great challenge to social research and a breeding
ground  for  multiple  sets  of  interpretations  and  subsequent
misunderstandings. Thus it remains an ideal to try to use as well-
defined concepts as possible. True! Yet this ideal may result in a
technical jargon that does not solve the problem, but adds to it, as
people outside now may know even less about what is talked
about.
Furthermore,  the  precision  of  technical  expressions  for
emotions, social relations, etc. is often obtained by emptying them
of the rich range of connotations of the everyday words they52
should replace. If so, precision is obtained by impoverishment.
Yet, if the challenge is not to simplify but to enrich the language of
social science, a vast vocabulary is the solution. But even though
more words are needed, too many are not. Thus, the dilemma
remains. Yet, social research will never be a science without an
adequate, richer and more precise vocabulary. Yet to strive for
understanding may be another way out, as we shall explore in the
last chapters.87
Correspondence rules are like recipes for cooking, a translation.
In order to make mayonnaise, you know you have oh so gently to
pour oil into yolk and stir with great care. Yet, you probably do
not have a clue as to whether the thickening process is a chemical
or physical one. It just works if you are careful enough.
Correspondence is “always“ possible
You may not be able to get away with everything, yet there is a lot
of ways you can pursue, knowingly or not, in order to achieve an
apparent correspondence between the sentences and what they
seemingly refer to, ref. Figure ACG.
•  Do not be too specific!
•  Use vague, basic concepts with a plurality of connotations.
•  Skip, gloss over or even suppress alternative evidence.
Or
•  Use simplified theories. For instance by reducing human
passions, e.g. “love for the other” into calculated self-interest
or to a biological drive to reproduce, etc.88
                                                   
87  Thus  this  haziness  point  towards  “several  interpretations/  /  multi-
perspectivism //
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Figure ACG: CORRESPONDENCE AS “THIS IS”
Adjoining to this text there are
as we all may be prepared to
see:
•  a letter O,
•  two ellipses or
•  a  look  into  a  hole  in
something, say a section of
paper  or  a  fragment  of  a
computer screen or
•  something that certainly is
not a girl, or even the face
of one.
Yet – referring to the 4th
image - there is no other place in the there is no other place in the
book where you might enjoy the looks of a girl
Correspondence is a necessary but not a sufficient criterion of truth
Summing up, in the realistic sense of the term: The mere claim for
correspondence is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition of
truth. And for all we know, what we see may not really be there
when looked at a second time. Or, as the saying goes:  “our senses
may deceive us”. So let us look at the alternatives.
Coherence
Without being able to compare “now” with what once was taken
for granted we would not have any perception of having been too
vague in our choice of words – misguided by terms of language
imposed on us by others, or even deceived to believe in non-
existing  entities.  Thus  we  had  better  support  any  specific
existential claims with as much evidence we can muster, be it by
triangulation, as the case researcher would, or rational arguments,
as some philosophers prefer. Thus the call for coherence and unity
of thought!54
The call for coherence – be it horizontal or vertical
The call for coherence includes, but goes beyond language. It may,
for  instance,  be  a  means  of  balancing  different  calls  for
correspondence with opus operandi and each other. An example:
Whether we will grant that the Jewish King Herod let thousands
of Palestine babies be killed around year 6 BC89 may depend on
what you want to believe. Yet, one might search for and compare
the claim in the New Testament with other sources believed to be
contemporary. That would be horizontal comparison. Horizontal
comparison is weighting evidence of what we assume must be of a
similar character, i.e. different reports about the same incident or
at least happenings of the same kind within a given space and/or
time frame.
Or one could explore vertically how well the claim for such an
atrocious act fits with what we consider then to have been the
practice of rulers, prevailing laws, and their administration.  Just
as we would – on a grander scale – have a hard time trying to
convince others if we claim some elementary claim to be true
which  runs  counter  to  a  comprehensive  system  of  thought
accepted by them. Try, e.g., to persuade a materialistic atheist that
holy men can materialize objects out of the blue in violation of
both the First and Second Law of Energy of Physics. It would be
miraculous if we could!
Thirdly, the idea of coherence is often perceived as an analogue
to mathematical reasoning. Whether “the sum of squares of the
two smaller sides of a right-angled triangle equals the square of
the third” is not determined by measuring thousands of triangles.
It is proven. The claim can be deduced from within the framework
of the Geometry of Euclid. So, as coherence is the very stuff that
makes  deduction  possible,  some  social  researchers  insist  on
formulating their – as they see it, justified, I am sure – beliefs about
reality in mathematical-like terms. Thus, a proposed economic
relation is only accepted if it can be deduced from or combined
with the system of laws of the Economy one subscribes to.
Coherence  is  thus  a  question  of  “fit  by  comparison”,  either
horizontally, by weighing different sources of empirical evidence
                                                   
89   Later refer back, how e.g.the two words “Jewish” and “Palestine” each
creates their own threads of associations.55
against each other, or vertically, towards theory. For the use of
coherence as a means for ranking, see figure CODES.
Figure  CODES:  RANKING  AS  A  FEATURE  OF  SELF
DETERMINATION
Coherence is part of our
daily  routines.
     Some  of  our  desires
may  be  ranked
horizontally,  say
evaluating  where  to  go
for  a  holiday.  Or  at  the
amusement  park,  where
and on what to spend our
last $10.
   In  other  situations
however  and  they  are
generally more difficult –
we  involve  ourselves  in
vertical evaluation.
Thus we may have to weigh an immediate short-term gratification
horizontally towards something we would have to do if we want
to achieve a long-term – often classified as higher – desire E.g.
avoid eating and fast in order to, say, experiment with and solidify
one’s “free will”. Or keep the last $10 in the pocket for a text book.
Just as the same aim may be achieved through several means, so
may the same means – as the dotted arrow – serve more than one
aim.
Vertical coherence – be it forwards or backwards
Vertical coherence demands that a claim I make must be shown
logically to fit into an already established hierarchy of systemized
thought.
This can work in two directions – either we can start with a
proposition and try to justify it by going backwards, showing how it
is consistent with the notions about reality we already subscribe to
– or we can try to go forward, deducing propositions about reality
by applying a chosen law to circumstance.56
But it is hard for most of us to admit that anything could be
possible, should it run counter to our chosen basic belief about the
nature of the world (ontology) or how true knowledge is acquired
(epistemology).  Hard-headed  materialists  might  believe  that
cosmos started with a Big Bang, but not that the exploding “Light”
was from God. They just claim that nothing was before, despite
this flagrantly violate both the basic laws of Energy.
Secondly, going backwards on an explicating trail is fraught
with danger. Neither causes nor structure can be deduced from
behaviour.90 This is a point of grave importance for interpretation
too, as we shall later see. What we observe may have many causes.
But  this  is  also  exactly  why  it  is  worth  trying.  Tracking
assumptions may not tell us much about the world, but it will at
least tell us something about ourselves. And even better, we may
become all the wiser by being told that what we assume is not
what somebody else reckons as, e.g., causes.
Forward integration is a much more controllable and open process.
The way “we” put theoretical knowledge to the test! Time91 will
soon show whether we are able to apply theory to circumstance,
e.g.  tell  local  management  and  union  leaders  how  to  reduce
absence. What about a 10% wage increase for those who have had
less than one week’s sick leave during the past year? Whether it
will work is of course circumstantial.
The  ability  to  forecast  is  often  taken  as  the  ultimate
justification/proof  of  coherence  within  a  body  of  knowledge.
Mechanical physics is of course the most beautiful example of a
mathematically based Logos of vertical coherence by which we are
able not only to describe but also forecast the movements of bodies
as they are exposed to forces.92
Forward  integration  is  thus  the  way  engineers,  designers,
consultants,  therapists  and  managers  work:  Identification  and
integration of bits and pieces planned to act together as hydro-
                                                   
90 One of the major findings of General Systems Theory
91 Diligent readers have readily noticed that in this sentence - however
intentionally “true”, time appears as if it were an entity in itself. It is
confusing, but so is language.
9257
electric plants, well-organized office buildings or mutually helpful
teams.
Backwards coherence and the unity of existence, examples of
Backwards searching trails for coherence may be as dangerously
speculative as mind-opening and even nurture our sense for unity
of existence. Allow me to illustrate.
First a trivial example: Empiricists may be right, what we know
of is what we sense. But is not there more to the world than what
just hits the eyes? What we sense is the outer surface of other
bodies  as  well  as  what  is  going  on  in  our  own,  as  already
illustrated by figure  7,  page  XX.  So  may  be,  there  is  a  family
likeness between what I express and feel, and what is going on
within others when they radiate expressions I accordingly read as
signals.
But let us take a step further backwards. Our embryological
development seems to bear traces of a progress we share with
other mammals, so maybe we share behavioural traits with other
animals. This cannot be observed directly by phenomenological
introspection,  but  only  indirectly  through  cross-comparative
studies. And even – and I regret it may offend some – I am deeply
fascinated with the thought that we share many of our most basic
emotional patterns with the other mammals. If so, it is touching to
see the diligence with which a cow with her eyes follows the
playful jumping around of her young calf or the methodological
curiosity with which hunting dogs scan a terrain.
Thus backwards search for coherence may have its potential
rewards of creating a sense of shared existence with others. Surely,
this may not be much more than a poetic vision to some. Yet
backwards searching for unity in a more prosaic way has also had
its spokespersons:
Reductionism and the call for the unity of science
The search for the essential principles governing nature, life and
social behaviour has hunted man for ages. Originally, Gods were
behind everything such as rain, love and death. Yet, the Greek
designers of city-colonies – like Heracleitus – had a vision: If laws
make city-states work, the same might be the case for nature. Thus
they began to look for “natural” causes.
As already hinted at, the first to establish a material cause as the
root for everything, in this case water, was Thales (around 600 BC).58
A moist soil is necessary in order to make plants grow, just like we
die if bled for our internal water. Furthermore, when cooled – as
could be seen in the Northern part of the Black Sea – the water
became solid; when heated, it evaporated into the air. Since then,
scores  of  people,  including  the  Mechanics  of  the  seventeenth
century, the nineteenth-century romanticists, Darwinists, Marxists
etc. have sought each their own more or less all-encompassing
principle.
Later the Logical Empiricists took over: Any science worth its
name should be grounded in and built up as inductions from a
basis of elementary sentences – referring to primary sense data -
from which more and more elaborate logical chains could lead us
to ever higher levels of laws.93 A nice ideal indeed! But hardly
achievable in a larger scale! We cannot even deduce why water is
transparent from what we know about the hydro- and oxygen
atoms. So we are back where we started. We believe we know
what  we  sense,  not  necessarily  why  it  is  so.  Of  course  the
transparency of water is good for fish, as we know them. Maybe
water has another colour in other galaxies as part of a godly
experiment with multiple worlds?
Yet  the  idea  is  very  simple: The higher aggregated sciences
should be derivable from the lower. Ideally, one should start at the
elementary level of atoms.
But it is easier to start from the world we know, from the top
that is. If so, the social domain should be based on psychology,
which in turn should be derived from biology, then chemistry.
Such a reductionistic94 programme sets a backwards working trail
–  step  by  step  –  for  deriving  the  more  aggregate  or  complex
systems of thought from simpler, more easily measurable ones.
While  behaviour  may  be  deduced  from  structure  –  as
exemplified with forward integration – structure cannot, as stated,
be derived from behaviour. So reductionism is naïve and may
become dangerous if it becomes a path towards simplification
rather than wholeness. Absence from work may have many causes
other than discontent.
                                                   
93 Rudolf Carnap: Der Logische Aufbau der Welt, Berlin 1928. This work from
his  youth  is  far  more  known  -  extreme  as  it  is  -  than  his  later  more
moderate works. Later refer back in connection with “grounded method.
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Yet, as already stated, going backwards identifying possible
causes may serve one well as a means of uncovering otherwise
hidden assumptions in one’s own thinking.95
Horizontal coherence
 –- be it logical or as sweeping statements across cases
Horizontal coherence is established as a comparison of claims at
the  same  level  and  as  such  far  less  complicated  than  vertical
coherence.
The classical example of horizontal coherence – based on logical
reasoning  –  is  the  controlled  experiment.  The  behavioural
reactions of e.g. a social group, GE, which has been subject to some
treatment, T, are compared to an otherwise similar group, GO,
which has not. If there is a difference in outcomes, OGE & OGO, this
will, with all due respect, be seen as the result of the treatment.96
Based on this we may claim: Under the specified conditions – the
given opus operandi – T may be the sufficient reason for the
occurrence of OEG .
Comparing or even integrating data from different sources is a
great  challenge  within  all  social  research  and  includes  source
critique of historical evidence; especially because it is virtually
impossible to present the opus operandi across culture and even
across contemporary society. En miniature this is why surveys
have  to  be  based  upon  questionnaires  from  hundreds  of
respondents. It is assumed that the sheer number of responses will
outbalance  all  the  individual  differences  amongst  the  people
asked. So, whereas surveys in principle might tell something in
general about a present situation, they will never be able to make
any valid, concrete claims.97
                                                   
96  John Stuart Mill: System of Logic, Book III, London 1843.
97 Later refer back in connection with Triangulation.60
The call for coherence as a weapon in the struggle for simplification – or
against it
Coherence  implicitly  claims  that  the  world  has  to  be  –  if  not
rational – then at least seen as if structured with an order language
can express. Indeed a strong claim and dangerous, too, as it may
tempt us to opt for one-dimensional rather than multi-faceted
clarifications.
The Kis-dictum, “Keep it simple”, might serve one well as a
hands-on rule, yet it is often more a projective excuse for not
exploring issues in their concrete detail. We may, too, recall that
“Ockam’s Razor,” formulated as  “It is a loss of time to employ a
number of principles when it is possible to use a few,”98 was not
directed at simplifying reality, but an invitation not to muddle
one’s  thinking  by  using  elevated  concepts  like  the  essence  of
things, etc.99
Thus, it is important to recognize that the call for coherence
should not be used as a weapon to erase unwelcome detail, nor to
make sense through simplifications. Quite the contrary!
The  call  for  coherence  should  be  seen  as  an  opportunity to
identify holes among the data from a field study, explore lapses or
conflicting  streams  in  one’s  own  tentative  thoughts,  tensions
between feelings or beliefs. The call for coherence should ignite us
unto a creative adventure in order to find out whether we can gain
the necessary knowledge to bridge gaps and holes.
Thus, it will serve one well as an obligation to abstain from the ill
practise of ‘theorampling’:  Sampling cases in support of what you
may have set out to prove, including erasing disturbing evidence
from your data files.
It is just like correspondence, the problem is not coherence per se,
but when it is missing.
Thus, the call for coherence should be taken as an impetus for
creative  exploration  and  not  as  a  straightjacket  or  a  call  for
simplification and, least of all, not as a temptation to get rid of
riddles or annoying data. If life is full of contradictions, if different
                                                   
98 See e.g. Jeremy Campbell: Liars Tale, - a history of falsehood, New York, 2001,
page XX.
99 William of Ockam (1285-1349) never used the word “razor”, but “principle
of economy”. He was, as the reader may recall, the founder of Nominalism.61
theories on motivation do not fit with each other, etc., why should
you expect your initial data to fit?
Coherence is an important yardstick for evaluating bits and
pieces of texts, statistics, and images – our own as well as others.
But always keep in mind that coherence in itself is no guarantee,
nor proof of anything. Language has a quasi-independence of its
own. It does not just mirror realities. Words refer to other words.
Texts refer to other texts – just look at the footnotes in the present
document!
To make a text more convincing by establishing a seemingly
coherence is to fake it. Actually, it should work the other way
round: Lack of coherence is a sign that something is left unfinished
and should as such call us back to the drawing board.100
Facts as multi-purpose building blocks
Yet I am sure such warnings will not prevent misuse, as the same
data often can be used as “building blocks” in several connections,
as illustrated in Figure OE. Adherents to the Darwinistic Evolution
Theory, for example, take the skeletons of dinosaurs as evidence
for their point of view: dinosaurs vanished as they could not
tolerate a change of climate. Yet, creationists use the same data to
state that, obviously, not all animals were included in Noah’s Ark.
Some of them were simply too big!
Single facts cannot prove a theory, although they may very well
convince some of us!
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Figure OE: THE CHALLENGE OF OVERLAPPING EVIDENCE
Amongst  the  facts  we  could  observe,  some  are  brought  to  our
attention. Of these some are selected or, as we might say, slip trough
our  “intellectual  aware-ness  filter”  to  be  combined  in  different
configurations of inductions.
    Different  inductions  based  upon  partially  overlapping
configurations often - everything else being equal – our ability to
make  sense  out  of  statements  presented  to  us.  Yet,  it  may  be
worthwhile to try, as illustrated by figure OE.1 below.63
Figure  OE.1:  AN  EXAMPLE  OF  HOW  THE  SAME
AGGREGATED FACTS MAY BE USED AS BUILDING BLOCKS
IN DIFFERENT CLASSIFICATIONS
Two  often-quoted  signs  of  the
internal  state  called  Stress  are
Aggression  and  Social
Withdrawal.
   I  do  not  claim  these  two
indicators  are  sufficient  for  the
conclusion, nor that there may be
other indicators for stress. I only
claim  that  the  simultaneous
presence of Aggression and Social
Withdrawal may indicate Stress.
Yet,  Aggression  and  Social
Withdrawal  may  also  each  be
building  blocks  in  other
conjectures  about  our  internal
realities.
   Aggression,  alongside
(inconsistent)  bragging,  may
indicate  the  presence  of  an
Inferiority Complex.
Next Social Withdrawal in combination with inconsistent bragging
could indicate a self-conceit, perhaps even schizophrenia.
    These are of course gross simplifications. Certainly, we need
more indicators in order to make the classifications hinted at. I
only want to illustrate how the same single fact can be a building
block  for  several  aggregate  combinations,  as  indicated  by  the
dotted arrows64
Coherence is “always“ possible
As is the case for correspondence, you may not be able to get away
with everything, yet there is a lot of ways through which you,
knowingly  or  not,  may  achieve  apparent  coherence  between
statements.
•  Just because you have identified an antecedent condition for
a phenomena to occur does not mean you have identified the
cause. What you found just may be a necessary but not a
sufficient condition.
For some – idealists in particular – the “drive” to establish some
kind of coherence is all-important, as they insist that all we know
of is within our consciousness: “The distinguishing characteristic
of reality cannot be in correspondence with things but coherence
amongst representations”.101 Yet others – realists in particular –
do  have  to  search  for  evidence  outside,  say  a  mathematical
universe.
As a curious afterthought we may finally remind ourselves that
– according to Gödel – if a system of thought is complete, then it is
incomplete.102  Thus,  a  grand,  however  coherent,  theoretical
formal structure cannot compensate for slim or unsubstantiated
evidence.  Theories  have  to  be  coherent,  but  coherence  is  not
enough. Furthermore, as already alluded to, language is a unity in
the sense that all words refer to and may be defined by others.
Thus the call for meaning in general and coherence in particular is
as  comprehensible,  necessary  and  demanding,  as  it  may  be
poisonous.
                                                   
101 Ref to Frederic C. Beiser: German Idealism - the struggle against subjectivism.
Harvard Un Press, US, 2002, page 93.
102  A Paraphrase on Gödel´s proof – relevant for axiomatic systems – which I
in vain have tried to grasp,65
Glaring inconsistencies in
contemporary social research and the call for coherence as a challenge
If one of the roles of theory is to create coherence, a lot remains to
be done. The body of social thought contains numerous examples
of inconsistencies. Some or perhaps even a majority of the flagrant
theoretical discrepancies in social research are due to the fact that
the adherents of different schools do not read each other’s texts,
nor wonder about the differences between each of their basic
tenets.
Let me just mention one: During the nineties, options to top
management became a favourite medicine for exponents of “share-
value” thinking to boost company performance in terms of return
on  investment.  Yet,  any  western  student  of  organizational
behaviour has been told about a) “Maslow’s pyramid” – claiming
that  when  your  basic  needs  have  been  met,  more  social  and
personal needs become important and b) the thinking of McGregor
and Hertzberg – claiming that the challenges and the content of
the job are more important than salary. Should this be true, it
appears to be unnecessary to give options to those with the most
challenging and meaningful jobs – top management. And should it
nevertheless be efficient, I am sure the curricula on motivation
within business schools ought to add some further distinctions as
well as dimensions in their training of students.
When tenets are different and the selection of data fields based
upon  ‘theorampling’,103  further  empirical  research  has  to
supplement  the  theoretical  work.  This  may  then  lead  us  to
discover new dimensions and sharpen our sense of circumstantial
conditionals.
Yet, pure speculation may, at least rhetorically, sometimes do
the trick, as when Democrit proposed his Atomic Theory104 as a
means of reconciling the hunt for the Eternal with the Obvious, a
world in constant change. An invention rather than the discovery
it was to become 2,500 years later!
                                                   
103  refer back to page ..
104 G. S. Kirk and J. E. Raven: The Presocratic Philosophers, (1957) Chapter xvii,
Cambridge University Press, 1963,  refer back to page 77.66
Coherence – a necessary but not a sufficient condition for truth
To sum up, coherence, like correspondence, is a necessary but not
a sufficient condition for truth. However elaborate the formal
structure of a set of theories might be, this in itself is no guarantee
of anything but at best formal unity.
Correspondence versus coherence and vice versa
We need more than ever to distinguish
between how we talk and what we talk about
Operationalism105 carried the claim for correspondence to an ,
demanding degree: qualities like red, empathy, institutional life
and love are defined and thus acquire meaning solely by the
means by which we are able to measure them.
Whereas others have carried the claim for coherence as the
essential  yardstick  for  truth  to  extremes,  e.g.  Hegel’s  famous
dictum: “What is rational is real and what is real is rational”.106
Such nonsense calls for interpretation. Conservatives took it to
mean that the ideas of the natural had to conform to present
practices, while it to radicals, e.g. Marxists, meant that theory –
theirs  naturally  –  is  true.  Realities  just  had  to  be  adjusted
accordingly. Yet, as already stated, the world is not logical, nor is it
chaotic. The world just is.
Yet,  it  is  still  worth  reminding  ourselves  that  the  claim  for
coherence is not necessarily to be seen as an ideological venture,
but as a quest for a broader and deeper search for consistency.107
One  implicit  lesson  from  our  discussion  of  “free  will”  is  that
language apparently has an inner coherence of its own, which may
let us talk without knowing what we talk about.108 Thus to be
able to speak may at times be a question about the right use of
words among peers rather than a search for correspondence. What
                                                   
105
106  ”Was  vernünftig  ist,  das ist  wirklich  und  was  wirklich  ist,  das  ist
vernünftig”. G. W. F. Hegel: Grundlinien der Philosophies des Rechts
(1821),  #  XX,  Ulstein,  1972.  Though  Charles  Taylor  suggests  this
translation: ”What is rational is actual and what is actual is rational”. Hegel,
Cambridge University Press, 1977, page 422.
107  This claim points forward to identification of holes,
108  include reference to ELIZA.67
is said to us has to have an internal logic that we recognize in
order for us to grasp it.
Thus, correspondence is needed as a corrective to the often all
too  smooth  self-propelling  associations  language  allows  us  to
make. Beliefs must be justified by something other than relations
to other justified beliefs. As coherence in itself is no guarantee of
truth, conclusions derived from within language have to be put to
a reality test.109
Apparently, it is a pointless to claim either correspondence or
coherence to be the supreme principle of truth in a scientific sense.
Correspondence and coherence implicitly presuppose the other:
•  Correspondence  is  necessary  for  epistemological  as  well  as
practical reasons.
•  Coherence is necessary for persuasive reasons – be it logical,
rhetoric  or  other  sorts  of  social  reasons,  including  a
commitment to search for wholeness.
•  Yet,  dependent  as  both  principles  are  on  language  and
customary ways of imagination, neither is sufficient.
If you want to apply or even to set up a design to challenge a
theory, it means that you will take correspondence as the means
for  experimenting  and  testing  a  presumably  coherent,
interconnected body of statements.
Otherwise, you may start with sets of empirical findings that – if
not systemized – at best are formulated as practical knowledge –
perhaps in the form of proverbs.110 E.g. “when swallows fly low,
it will soon be rain”. Proverbs may very well remain empirically
true, however be unintelligible. To be explainable observations
have to be integrated into a coherent whole, which – in this case –
combines meteorology, the lightness of insects, up-draft of air
when  the  ground  heats  up,  etc.  Thus,  the  inner  coherence  of
languages  is  the  only  frame  within  which  particulars  can  be
explained, interpreted or even understood.
                                                   
109  //Re explantion, refer back. Are there laws for human behavior or do we
just follow temporary rules:/ interpretation and understanding may – in
contrast to laws. Give us an inner sense of knowing what. We do not follow
laws we have self-awareness (or rather could have) and may imagine the
impossible, that world were different (critical theory, utopia).
110  John Elster: Alchemies of the Mind, - rationality and the emotions, Cambridge
University Press, 1999.68
However  true,  this  does  not  mean  that  coherence  and
correspondence always go together. There are myriads of relations
– between man and woman e.g. – which cannot be talked about
because they have neither a name nor a place within our languages
–  just  as  a  lot  of  the  occurrences  within  our  body,  known  as
feelings, do not have names. Yet this does not mean that they do
not exist, they are just not publicly recognizable – yet!
Nor does it mean that something necessarily exists in any other
sense than as words in the English language, just because you and
I can talk intelligibly about “angels” or may share notions of what
“free will” might mean.
Thus, actions to enhance correspondence and coherence not
only presuppose each other, they are needed as necessary correctives
to any application of either principle.
From correspondence and models of behavior to the call for coherence
We are so used to seeing “cut-through pictures” of engines or
plants that we might believe models of psychological and social
behaviour likewise should have a structural likeness with reality.
This is certainly not the case. The “super ego-ego-id” structure of
Psycho Analysis has no physical location in the human body, nor
do the similar concepts of Transaction Analysis: parent-ego-child.
They do not exist as anything else than, indeed, very practical
interpretative schemes.
What we do have, please see Figure DDR, is readings of select
events,  selected  in  the  sense  of  being  those  we  have  noticed.
Assuming nothing to occur without due cause, we infer that what
we see is generated by some processes. What we see is just a
fragment of what is happening around to and within us. Our drive
to explain may tempt, yes even drive us to create images of the
hidden. Thus, our ideas of the generating processes may be dim
and stretch from the old anthropomorphist idea that a) the outer
world  could  be  governed  by  some  or  one  “mighty  powerful
human” in the shape of God,111 to causality as something inherent
in natural life as Darwin proposed or even within societies as the
                                                   
111 This must not be read as a defiance of God. That people imagine the godly
according to our own partially culturally determined imaginary, just shows
how important the religious dimension is to many of us. It is even so
important that some people are ready to define themselves by denial
thereof, - atheist that is.69
later-day functionalists, i.e. Marxists, believe. Or b) that our inner
life  too  is  subject  to  innate  forces  which  structurally  remains
hidden for us even though the consequences of their presence is
obvious as proposed by the genetic epistemology of Piaget,112 the
psycho-social  development  model by  Erik  Erikson113  or
Chomsky’s idea of innate schemata for structuring experience.
114115
Figure  DDR:  DIFFERENT  DOMAINS  OF  REALITY,  SENSED
AND IMAGINED
Our  conceptions  of  the  world  are  partly  derived  from  our
receptivity,  the  pressure  of  the  outside  world  on  our  senses,
                                                   
112 Jean Piaget: Genetic Epistomology, Columbia Un Press, 1970
113 Erik Erikson: Eight Ages of Man in Childhood  and  Society and Identity:
Youth and Crisis, New York, 1950
114 N. Chomsky: Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, 1965.
115  See also Charles Taylor: What is involved in Genetic Psychology (1971)
reprinted in Human Agency and Language, philosophical papers, chapter six,
1985 Cambridge University Press.70
shaped by inference, emotions and the language we have learned
to apply.
We are embedded in several layers of reality. One of the most
superficial, although the one we know best, is that of the apparent
reality  of  what  we  notice,  and  of  which  we  have  words  and
images.
What we do not notice, though, is but a small part of what is
noticeable in principle. There is far more to sense and “take in”
from the manifest domain than we are alerted to.
Far the greater part of what is happening within and around us
– be it the functions of our organs, our emotional scars or the
decision-making of the upper offices – is either hidden for us or
just passes us by without being consciously noticed. But we either
know  of  or  imagine  the  presence  of  more  encompassing,
underlying or deeper realms living within or around us.
Metaphorically, it is as if there are filters between the different
levels, of which the “upper” is more easy to widen or close, while
the potential penetration filter is far more impassable in so far as
most of us cannot sense the presence of our kidneys, nor do we
have access to the inner thoughts of, let us say, our superiors.
Such conceptual images – if accepted – shape our perceptions of
the real. We may even let ourselves be seduced to adhere to the
naïve assumption that just because something has been given a
name, then “this something” must have some sort of existence
outside language.116 And, indeed, they might be grounded in a
relation to a by-gone reality, now hidden or even forgotten under
layers of additional texts, like the term “free will”. As long as we
let such words determine what we look for and even imagine to
“see” just because we have learned to talk that way, we will be an
inexhaustible  source  of  confusion.  And  others  may  wonder
whether our use of such concepts is due to our lack of reflective
skills, ideologically determined or even expressions in bad faith!
Apparently, correspondence and coherence are both relevant
and  complementary  to  our  search  for  reliable  knowledge,  yet
something more is needed. Maybe some of the proposed, more
cynical criteria of truth might help.
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TRUTH, THE MORE CYNICAL CRITERIA
Socially related criteria of truth derived from human behaviour117
We have just touched upon the two primarily epistemological
criteria  of  truth,  correspondence  and  coherence,  and  their
methodological implications. I have the greatest respect for both
approaches. Yet, there are often glaring inconsistencies between
what researchers say they aim at, and what they actually do. The
respect paid to correspondence and coherence may even serve as a
cover-up for what is actually done. And if caught red-handed, we
are  all  too  ready  to  excuse  ourselves  with  the  mantra:  Social
research – as everything else – is political.
So we may have to approach the social reality with a suspicious
attitude. Personally, I believe we ought to face the challenges and
be aware of both the politics of actual practice, the ideal and the
difficulties of living up to them. So, we do have to deal with actual
practices rather than just present research as a glamorous truth-
seeking hunt for knowledge. But I will leave it to people to decide
themselves whether they will a) surrender to cynicism and thus
tempt others to become equally unfaithful and opportunistic or b)
strive  to  erase  personal  and  professional  biases  and  hunt  for
completeness.
                                                   
117  I am indebted to Søren Kjørup, RUC, for drawing my attention to some of
these references. The topic could certainly be expanded, but that is not the
trail of thought to be pursued here. But for those interested I may refer to
the reference work by Barry Allen: Truth in Philosophy, Harvard University
Press, 1993 and Jeremy Campbell: The Liars Tale, - a history of Falsehood, New
York, 2001.72
Personal, inter-subjective, elitist and semantic notions about truth
“.. men believe their reason governs words.
Yet in fact words turn back and reflect their power
upon the understanding .. “
Francis Bacon, 1620118
If truth is recognized as a valuable social asset, we can expect some
to cheat in order to appear as if they uphold it, while others – the
suspicious119 – will be on the alert to show the world how those
who set the standards fake it. But the struggle for recognition as a
guardian of truth is not only a question of persuading others, it
might as well be ourselves who are on the lookout for texts that
can be taken as evidence of what we want to believe and thus see
substantiated. If paranoid, one is led to create evidence for being
persecuted. Yet, being paranoid does not exclude one from being
persecuted.
Fundamental beliefs work on at least four levels: the ways we
sense, both as biological beings and as we are shaped socially, the
language we use and the philosophies we have been led to accept
or even advocate:
•  We are bound by the way we sense as biological entities: “all
our perceptions – both of our sense and our minds – are
reflections  of  man,  not  of  the  universe.  The  human
understanding is like an uneven mirror that cannot reflect
truly the rays from objects, but distorts and corrupts the
nature by mingling its own nature with it”, as Francis Bacon
wrote.120
•  Our own enclosure: our personal world of emotional scars,
vanities, aspirations and sense of social realities we have to
recognize, be it authorities or people we admire or hate.121
•  The  social:  the  structures  of  language  for  exchange  of
commodities, favours including gifts, definitions, including
                                                   
118 Francis Bacon: Novum Organum (1620), in English by Open Court Publ.
Comp. 1994, page 63.
119  Among the Masters of Suspicion one can e.g. mention Nietzsche, Freud,
Marx - of which only the first was suspicious not only of others, but of
himself too.
120 What he called Idols of the Tribe, see page 53-54.
121  Idols of the Cave, as Francis Bacon called it.73
conceptions of what we or other people need and are able to
name.122
•  Cultural systems: transference of systems of thought and
speculation.123
It is fair enough to say that anyone – on the personal level – is
entitled to his own opinions for whatever reasons. But, certainly,
twilight confirmation is an added comfort. So people – not least
researchers – gather with peers in groups in order not only to
support each other but also to convey their message through the
creation of professional societies, magazines, text books and not
least positions within academia from which they with the power
achieved try to exercise the control they want. Newcomers to the
field have to accept the conceptual framework and its supporting
ideology in order to pass exams.
Within this frame, truth is no longer an epistemological issue
but a plus-word to bolster a certain set of beliefs, exercise power
and promulgate tradition, see Figure CT. And soon it becomes
difficult to find out where it all starts and where it ends:
So behavioural-based arguments include several notions of truth
that
•  a  group  –  or  even  better  en  elitist  group  of  researchers
between themselves, inter-subjectively, that is – either take for
granted  or  with  humble  boastfulness  claim  to  be  their
justified true beliefs. Thus, e.g., sociology has been defined
as what sociologists do and expect newcomers to submit to.
Or as social constructivist may state: Truth is what we share
by talking the same language, believing the words we use
mean the same to us.
In cases where political awareness is needed, the elite may even
maintain
•  double standards of truth – one for us – the enlightened ones –
and one for the population at large. E.g. conflict sociologists
maintain that they themselves - as university researchers -
are truthful, while other leaders of men, industrial managers
in particular, cannot be. Just like managers may distinguish
                                                   
122  Idols of the Market Place, as Francis Bacon called it.
123  Idols of the Theater, as Francis Bacon called it.74
between the whole truth about a situation and what the
employees just need to know.
Likewise, with a slightly different twist, “truth” has been defined
as:
•  What those in power see fit to set as a standard for others to
follow in order that their own positions may be maintained.
Thus  “truth-value”  is  reduced  to  a  question  about
ideology124  and reflected  in  systems  of  thought  that  at  a
glance may appear to be “just objective”, e.g. curriculum,
examinations, systems for ranking of universities, etc.
“Truth is a thing of this world”, as Foucault states, it is
produced only in virtue of multiple forms of constraint.125
Often several power groups are involved:
•  What is seen fit appears as facts and thus what is judged fit
to print may be subject to negotiation, e.g.:
o between a case researcher – representing academia – and a
manager from the organization where she has done her
fieldwork – as was the case for the infamous Hawthorn
studies,126
o or the editor of a magazine or printing house may ask the
author  to  present  her  findings  in  a  specific  way,  e.g.  a
printing house associated with Cornell University was kind
enough  to  consider  printing  my  book,  “The  Employee
Owner”, but asked me to withdraw the more personal stuff
such  as  accounts  of  my  emotional  reactions  during
fieldwork.127
                                                   
124 Ideological truth: to claim Jesus is born at x-mas or to believe in the
inherent supremacy of  democracy.
125 Michel Foucault: Power/knowledge, selected writings (1972-9)  Harvester
Wheatsheaf, 1980, page 131. This statement however true is only so in a
parasitic sense. The constraints alleged to should not be seen as goals in
themselves but as means to achieve, yes pardon me, truth (realist sense).
Yet undoubtedly goal displacement will occur if and when bureaucracy
gets the upper hand.
126 See Gillespie
127   The role of editors for the advancement of science is certainly widely
recognized, yet under-researched.75
•  Some  even  claim  that  industrial  funding  may  influence
research.
o  A study of published Medical Research showed that “for
whatever  reason”  the  reports  of  otherwise  independent
investigators are more favourable regarding the effects of
the  drugs  examined,  when  the  work  is  funded  by  the
company producing them.128
Yet, whatever is said, it is still up to the audience at large to define
who is going to be regarded as outstanding scientists like Darwin
and Freud. Thus, we also have to consider
•  the role of the audience.  The  greatness  of  Darwin  is  still
beyond dispute. Freud is not so great now as he was. And
some are just great for the time being because they state
something a select audience loves to hear as, e.g., when
Mead was taken in by liberals, as her study on the people of
Samoa was a great argument in favour of education rather
than heredity in shaping man’s behaviour.129
Thus,  some  –  social  constructivists  in  particular  –  claim  that
“truth” is not necessarily merely a matter of power, but of rules,
which each school of social research has institutionalized as its
own. If so,
•  different schools of social research are like games. Just like
chess, boxing or the grammar of a language they each have
their own rules for what should and can be considered as
valid and thus granted to be potentially acceptable.
This cynical or even playful and “judged by appearance” view of
“truth as a game” seems to have a lot going for it. Each science has
its own concepts, focuses and thus standards for how its adherents
                                                   
128 Lise L. Kjærgaard & Bodil Als-Nielsen: Association between competing
interests and authors´conclusions, British Medical Journal, Vol. 325, 3 august,
2002.
129 Margaret Mead: The Coming of Age in Samo (1928), New York, 1973 and a
critique: Derek Freeman: Margaret Mead and Samo, - the making and un-
making of an anthropological myth, Harvard University Press, 1983, and for
an  evaluation:  Erik  Maaløe:  Casestudier,  Akademisk  Forlag  (1996),
Copenhagen 2002.76
are supposed to behave. I am sure some may even take the validity
schemes to be presented later in this essay as an example. Yet, to
accept it would be a betrayal of any search for completeness.
So, some people claim that truth will prevail in the long run. Thus,
it may be useful to make a final distinction between
•  what may be considered as true in the short as well as in the
long perspective, respectively.
Historically, truths for the natural as well as social sciences have
their time. At any time different groups have vested interests in
each  their  own  established  truth.  Thus,  it  must  be  an  “uphill
struggle”  for  every  new  perspective  to  establish  itself.  Thus
Kuhn,130 for one, was fond of quoting the rather bitter remark by
the physicist Max Planck:
“A new scientific truth does not triumph by convincing its
opponents and making them see the light, but because the
opponents eventually die”.131
Yet,  social  researchers  do  not  –  like  the  natural  scientists  –
continuously integrate and absorb new insights into the past. A
young physicist will hardly ever lay his hand on an original text
by Maxwell. This is not the case within the Humanities, nor social
research! Aristotle is still read, as deserve Durkheim, Weber and
Merton to be. Social truths may change, yet the debate goes on
whether they should or not.132 Some die only to re-emerge at a
later stage.133 As an example, let me just mention that Darwin´s
                                                   
130 Thomas S Kuhn: The  Structure  of  Scientific  Revolutions, University of
Chicago Press, 1962.
131 Max Planck: Wissenschaftliche Selbstbiographie (1948), page 22 or Scientific
Autobiography and Other Papers, translation by F Gaynor, 1949, PAGE 33-34.
Quoted by Thomas S Kuhn up cit, page 150.
132  To be refered back to:
133  The reader may recognize that I in the present work has amused my self
by forwarding quotes to arouse the reader awareness that views to day
associated with social constructivism has an up to thousand years old
tradition behind them. Which in itself does not prove anything, beyond
mans ever going reflections about language and what it may refer to.77
study of the expression of the emotions in man and animals134
was ignored for more than hundred years, however, I am sure it
will soon be read again with care.
Figure  CT:  CRITERIA  FOR  TRUTHS  GROUNDED  IN  THE
SOCIAL DOMAIN
Albeit  we  might
distinguish  theoretically
between  fundamental
beliefs by origin: private
idio-syncrasies,  group
thinking  or  culturally
grounded  –  they  are
certainly  interrelated.
Most of – if not all – our
personal ideas are chosen
from  the  cultural
repertoire.
Next, private or not, it is at least a comfort that others have or do
share the somewhat similar ideas. Ideas we, thirdly, may want to
present to a bigger audience
Thus one might wonder what place, if any, the idea of scientific
progression  –  so  dear  to  Natural  Science  –  has  within  Social
Research.
The rhetorical approach to truth
Finally, let me briefly introduce the redundancy theory of truth,
which draws our attention to the fact that stating: “It is true that
aRb135” is no different than just stating “aRb”. Nothing is added
in terms of what is claimed to be.136 We shall later see whether
                                                   
134  Charles Darwin: The expression of the emotions in man and animals, (1872),
UK
135  aRb: “a is related in a specified way to b”
136   we  will  later  return  to  this  theory  and  deal  with  it  more  detail
(exaggeration).78
this is a wholesome interpretation or not. So let us return to the
more scientific conceptions of truth:
Pragmatism as an antidote to our eagerness to explain
Of the two principles, search for correspondence and coherence,
the latter is by far the most likely to foster bias: Confronted with
deficient traits in their lines of thought, social scientists – as if they
were guardians of a certain truth – may draw themselves into
defensive  reactions  rather  than  opening  themselves  to  any
disturbing perspectives that others may have to offer: 137 Thus we
should continuously keep in mind:
•  Just because some data, {D}, support a theory, T, it may lead us
into error, if we extend T to cover all {D}s, as when Freud
claimed to know better than Dora what was going on inside
herself, his patient, even though she was able to predict his
behaviour.138 One of the fallacies of misplaced opus operandi!
•  As soon as a social theory has established itself, the professors
supporting it may, by implication, induce the next generation of
researchers to take this approach for granted and the only one
worthy of further exploration. Thus the perspective chosen
determines the real. The interpretation of the real may even
become so firmly honoured that methodology – the ways of
identifying the determining concepts  – becomes undisputed.
•  At last – as the half-automatic refusal of others may give rise to
some anxiety – the desire to present oneself as an expert139
may  become  more  important  than  to  search  for  exceptions
and/or in-depth explorations.
                                                   
137 Reference ought to be paid to Festinger and Rothstein ???
138   Sigmund  Freud:  Fragment  of  an  analysis  of  a  case  of  hysteria (1901),
sometimes  published  as  Dora,  Standard  Edition  of  The  Complete
Psychological Works, Vol VII page 69.
139 The will to explain, ref. op.cit. page….79
Post-fact explanation
In order to show your ability to “explain” something, it is safest to
start from the outcome and then establish the reasons that might
have caused it. A trick that Aristotle put to good use: Bodies do fall
to the ground because it is their nature. And, of course, we have
political  experts,  who  –  after  an  election  –  have  all  the  right
explanations at hand to make clear why the rest of us dumb heads
voted as we did.
Obviously, the human mind seems all too quick to make sense
of  occurrences  by  drumming  up  an  explanation.  After-fact
explanations may – as any other type of rhetoric – convince some.
But it does not suffice. It is nice that a treatment works, but why is
quite another matter. Not all are satisfied with just words. “Why”
calls for an exploratory approach that digs below the obvious:
How does a diligent case researcher decide how good manager
x is? Well, you might listen to how she sees her role or what her
underlings have to say about her goals. Yet, it may be safer to look
at her achievements and not just her intentions. Consequently,
evaluation has to depend on a clarification of opus operandi, a
“before” as well as an “after-fact” empirical analysis.
Pragmatism
The rhetoric of “post fact explanation” has led some people to
claim that the proof of “real science” ought to be the ability to
forecast what will happen to A under a given set of circumstances,
C1,  C2,  ..  ,  Cn.  140  If  so,  we  should  expect  any  genuine
organizational consultant – like a doctor – to be able to
a) identify the situation of a failing company, including the type of
market,  technology,  amount  of  financial  resources,  type  of
organizational  culture  and  the  personalities  of  the  people
involved, and thus
b)recommend a treatment based upon the ability to foresee the
result of different alternative treatments, be it a
o  Top-Down approach as a Business Re-engineering Expert or
a
o  Bottom-Up approach by a consultant, or an
                                                   
140  Thus, in consequence, the search for simplistic all encompassing “laws
for the social” as a inspired by Newton Physics.80
o  Actions Research initiative based on participation and/or
activism.
c)  The meaning of concepts may (but ought not just) be derived from
a  coherent  system  of  texts.  They  may  also  –  according  to  the
criteria of correspondence – be established from outside in terms
of  recognizable  consequences  for  what  may  happen  to  us  or
others, if and when we let them guide us to action.141
Thus the pragmatic stand: The ability to forecast is the only true sign
of  knowledge  that  is  workable  and  not  just  rhetoric.  Both
correspondence and coherence matter but competence to act even
more so.
The real has no logic, it just is. We cannot expect any language
to  be  able  to  catch  the  real  in  all  its  diversity.  Yet,  without
retraceable references to the real and a coherent language, we
would not be able to ponder on consequence and discuss what
might be. Competence may be for the gifted ones, yet without a
sense for correspondence and coherence, prediction would be
virtually impossible. It is a trinity; see Figure CPC.
Of course we fail to foresee. Pipes do break, but plumbers do
indeed  succeed  in  recommending  practical  cures.  And  so  do
hospital doctors, therapists and organizational advisers. They may
even  outline  when  one  cure  rather  than  another  should  be
followed, because the interwoven collections of theories that they
rely on are conditioned by overall as well as minute discerning
sets of opus operandi.
                                                   
141  Refer to Charles Peirce: Pragmatism and Pragmaticism § 9, (1903), Collected
Papers, vol V. Havard Un Press, 1974. An example: The “truth” of legal
laws can not be deduced from the text itself. It is an empirical task to be
revealed by analysis of how a given set of written laws are used in court to
free or sentence people accused for violating them, - the positive law idiom.81
Figure  CPC:  REALIST  TRINITY  OF  CORRESPONDENCE,
COHERENCE AND PREDICTION
One  of  the  claims  of  the
realist  ethos  for  social
research is to combine
o  vigilant  observation
assumed  to  someway
correspond  to  a  reality
beyond language with
o a  search  for  consistent
patterns,
o  that may later be checked
against additional research
and most likely will be
enriched as shown in figure GG (next chapter)
Thus,  whether  or  not  the  practical  implications  of  a  given
intertwined set of correspondence and coherence rules help us to
achieve a desired result  – if not the last word – is then at least the
best guarantee for the time being – provided we continue to pay
the outmost attention to opus operandi.
How to deal with glib talk and exemptions to the otherwise accepted facts
We have already142 referred to Ricket and how the discovery of
allergy ran counter to his own preconceived notions of what to
expect. The history of science is full of similar cases to prove how
one cannot take it for granted that one knows. Take for instance an
all too often stated claim:
“A major managerial task is to motivate the employees”. We
have heard it so many times without reflecting on what remains
unsaid: If the employees are not motivated, maybe we should
consider why? Obviously, something is wrong and it need not just
be – as management prefer to put it – the employees. How about
taking a closer look at the structure of firm as well as management
to find out why?
Perceptions  and  classifications  alike  may  break  down  when
subjected to a closer examination. Yet belief-structures are seldom
                                                   
142 page XXX82
just completely wacky. They do have a bearing and a history
behind them – in the above case a past of self-defensive attitudes
not just amongst management but workers too. Thus, twisted
perceptions may not have to be utterly rejected, but we may, after
some  search,  have  to  supplement  the  original  categories  with
additional ones or replace them with even finer distinctions; as
was the case with defining and measuring intelligence, where the
original, more mathematical measures first was supplemented
with  a  linguistic  dimension,  later  to  be  extended  with  five
more.143
This is exactly one of the great challenges of one of the types of
case research:
•  to check whether the way a given organization is organized
or behaves is in accord with what is stated in the textbooks, –
Theory Test designs.
And if case and theory do not fit
•  explore whether and how we could change a given system of
theories, including their claims for validity.
..... and yet we know more than we think
The power of language is to describe and express our sense for the
real  as  well  as  stir  our  imagination.  Yet,  however  powerful,
languages have their limitations, as already alluded to more than
once. Luckily enough, however, we know more and are able to
accomplish more than we can articulate bywords. Think of what
the hands of a carpenter can do!
I, though, learned in another way. During my high school years
I tried to express myself through poetry in order to understand
what  went  on  inside  and  around  me.  However,  two  or  three
months would pass before I was able to understand the meaning
of  what  I  had  written  earlier.  That  is,  expression  precedes
comprehension, just like dreams. Thus, I realized that the body
contains knowledge that our ”mind” is unable to comprehend at
once, but which may emerge if you listen in a receptive mode.
                                                   
143  Gardner83
This insight has helped me in many ways. I rediscovered in it
the joy that was expressed by the activists in various ESOPs144
when they related what they had discovered they were able to
accomplish.  Just  as  I  –  in  the  confident  assurance  of  their
upcoming  success  –  encourage  students  to  pursue  more
complicated issues in their dissertations. An insight which at an
early  stage  laid  the  groundwork  for  my  assumption  that
“studying” instead of “learning to gain information” implies an
expressionist attitude to life. Our body and our relations with
other people hold insights of which our intellect is unaware.
Awareness is developed through readiness to surrender, to let
go and to see what happens, e.g. in the attempt.
THE VALIDITY SCHEME
It is easy to imagine how others may be conceited and thus, per
implication, how they – biased as they are – could be inclined to
consider us as biased. Thus we all have to be concerned with
validity, not least for our own studies.
“Validity” as a professional term is associated with a plurality
of meanings, all giving a certain status to claim:
•  Trustworthy:  acceptance  founded  on  an  inner  emotional
conviction that what is said is as it should be.
• 
Yet,  there  is  always  a  rhetorical  aspect  of  trustworthiness:
Persuasion,  seduction,  be  it  pragmatic  or  otherwise.  Thus,
scientists have called for rules to be imposed on everybody in
order to reduce bias, defined as an emotional inkling to accept or
reject views for personal reasons:
•  Validity:  meaning  in  accordance  with  a  set  standard  for
measurement  and/or  methodological  approach.  Being
correct is here the mantra.
•  Reliability: professionally established security that it is safe
for anyone to base one’s own work on a given claim, because
                                                   
144 ESOP: Employee-owned companies, refer to previous footnote # 6 XXXXX84
anyone following the same procedure should arrive at the
same conclusions.145
Concern  for  validity  enters  any  stage  of  social  research,  thus
several  more  precise  sets  of  criteria  for  validity  have  been
suggested. Although they differ in depth and scope for the various
scientific domains, they nevertheless all have to deal with the same
central issues relating to
•  what you intend to identify as your basic data;
•  how  you  will  be  able  to  identify  them,  e.g.  observation,
measurement, etc.;
•  how you draw them together to a synthesis,146 e.g. logically,
statistically, by pattern identification, etc.;
•  whether you can relate any synthesis achieved to other domains
of reality and if so, how.
Yet, the criteria do not share the same significance at all steps,
during or across different types of studies. In the discovery mode
e.g.  the  concern  for  validity  is  not  so  much  a  question  of
commitment to  the  standards established  by  others.  It  should
rather be seen as a means of fighting one’s own one-sidedness and
guide oneself to more encompassing pictures of prevailing as well
as  potential  realities.  Only  later  may  the  concern  be  directed
towards how others might evaluate the findings as well as one
may ponder upon whether they may be applicable to other arenas.
Please refer to Figure BSV for an overview, which we will use
as the basic reference.
                                                   
145  ”Arriving at the same conclusions” is per definition impossible to achieve
in the social realm as what we study – in principle and as the old Greek
knew  –  most  does  not  have  the  same  time  permanence  as  natural
phenomena. Nevertheless I believe some consistency may – period for
period  –  occasionally  be  obtained  within  a  given  culture.  And  if  not
perhaps there might be some pattern in how change occur and what
propels it.
146   Thus we implicitly assume that the final outcome of research in some
way will appear as a condensation of a greater mass as well as variety of
some basic elements, be it observations, hunches, etc.85
Figure BSV: THE BASIC SCHEME FOR VALIDITY
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a. definitions and compilations are confined as a domain within the
theoretical universe of a science.
b. generation of data, though, refers to an apparent outside reality,
just as the application of results may point to other theories,
schools of thought or realities to emerge in the form of future
practices.
c. Compilation, as defined above, implicitly states that what you
come to weave together as patterns not only depends on what
you did identify as facts, but on the theories and integration
rules you apply - whether or not you are aware of it.
d. The  table  may  be  read  as  if  stating  that  facts  come  before
theories. This is not so. There are a lot of theoretical schemes –
mundane or scientific, implicit or explicit – behind the means
by which facts are generated.86
Coherence may be established in many ways, for natural science
ultimately in the form of casual chains.147 Yet in our case it must
also include interpretative studies that “demonstrate how acts and
events can be read as signs that indicate the existence of something
more important for those who can see them beyond their sheer
occurrence,” aiming to make the world intelligible to us.
Different branches of the social sciences give their own names to
the different criteria and even leave some of them out.
Historians invest great effort in #1.1 under the name of Source
Critique  and  #2.1  as  Inter-Subjective  Control  amongst  peers,
whereas #2.2 may be considered irrelevant for studies of events,
like the social, which are never going to reoccur – the ideographic
claim.148
Economists, on the other hand, even though they mainly rely on
statistics collected by others, hardly ever bother about the accuracy
of the figures they use. Instead they devote a lot of ingenuity in
developing compilation schemes, #2.1.
Experimental researchers are probably amongst those who are
most committed to take them all on. Their problem, though, is
whether the results of laboratory studies can be transferred to real-
life situations,# 2.2? E.g. can experiments with a small band of
strangers with different problem-solving techniques be transferred
to companies where people have known each other for long? Can
we really presume that lived life does not mean anything for how
we behave?
The following chapters will attempt to show how the schemes
change with different kinds of case research.
Truth and validity
Validity criteria have to build, in one way or another, on the
criteria of truth already referred to. And they do, as shown in
Figure BVT.
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148 Sciences that deal with repetitive phenomena are usually called, nomotetic,
from Greek: “Laws” for what according to custom usually happens.
In contrast, sciences that look exclusively upon events that are perceived as
unique  in  time  and  space  are  called  ideographic, from Greek “idiot”,
meaning private or better here, unique.87
Figure BVT: VALIDITY SCHEME RELATED TO PREVALENT
NOTIONS OF TRUTH
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Figure BVT sums up the chapter. Yet, we may have to elaborate
just a little on 1.1:
To state what matters is up to the researcher. Prevalent theory
may of course serve as a directive and may perhaps for some even
be a sufficient reason in itself. If so, one should consider whether
one  wants  to  be  a  technician  or  a  researcher?  If  you  commit
yourself to a theory just because it is, e.g. socially convenient, then
this is just your way of telling others who you are.
As we have seen, truth is as much a question of reference as a
question of how people reason about what they see happening
around and within themselves. Thus we have to consider what
people aim at by attempting to explain, interpret or understand.
                                                   
149  The personal decision or will to believe have been called ideal truth, refer
also to page XXX.88
Truth! What is the problem?
Finally,  we  may  ask  ourselves  why  “we”  in  general  are  so
occupied with truth. Could it be that the real problem is that
people cheat? That we as researchers like to cut corners? That we
forgo facts that could challenge the theories we are known to
purport?
Pragmatically, lying is of course all right as long as it works and
you are not caught in the act. Yet, the cost of deception is one of
self-betrayal! Maybe working to uncover one’s own personal and
professional biases would – although more personally distressing
here and now – be a more profitable approach in the end, not only
for oneself, but also for those who take our words at face value? 
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